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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BOARD
INDEPENDENCE*
URSKA VELIKONJA

Institutional investors, exchanges, and government regulators
have pushed for increased board independence. The push has
continued despite, at best, inconclusive evidence that independent
boards improve corporate performance or reduce corporate
malfeasance. This Article suggests that institutional investors
value director independence because it displaces more
meaningful reform.
Regulatory reform is inevitable after corporate scandals and
crises. But, the content of that regulation is not inevitable.
Institutionalinvestors and managershave successfully convinced
lawmakers to rely on corporate governance reforms in lieu of
more stringent substantive regulation. Reforms involving
independent boards have been popular with Congress and
regulators because independence has connotations of objectivity,
expertise, and fairness, because independence is familiar, and
because Congress wants to minimize the cost of regulation and
independence is inexpensive.
Independence may be inexpensive, but it is also ineffective.
Managerial disloyalty to investors is only one type of
misconduct. Since boards put the interests of investors first, the
board may not stop misconduct that siphons resources from
other groups to investors, from price fixing and bribes to
excessive risk taking and fraud. Future corporate and financial
reform should not aim to protect investors from management.
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Rather, it needs to control externalities that investors themselves
impose on others. Board independence mandates should be
retired because they are inefficient at best and damagingat worst.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the millennium, boards of directors of public
companies have become considerably more independent. In 2000,
78% of directors were independent, 22% of companies had only one
nonindependent director, and 23% of companies had a nonexecutive
chairman.' By 2013, 85% of directors were independent; 2 60% of
boards had only one nonindependent director-the CEO-and 45%
had a nonexecutive chairman.3 While the trend towards more
independent boards is not new, boards approaching complete
independence are of a recent vintage.!
Majority independent boards are traditionally associated with
superior firm performance and better oversight of executives.' But
1. SPENCER STUART, 2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 8 (2010) [hereinafter

2010 SSBI], available at https://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSB12010.pdf.
2. SPENCER STUART, 2013 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 6 (2013) [hereinafter

2013 SSBI], available at https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/PDF%20Files/Research
%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/SSBI-2013 01Nov2013.pdf. The study relies on proxy
statements issued by Fortune 500 companies, all of which are listed on the NYSE or
NASDAQ. Both exchanges define "independence" similarly: a director will be deemed
independent if she has no financial or familial ties to the firm or its management other
than her directorship. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL],
available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=
chpi1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F; NASDAQ Listing Rules
§ 5605(a)(2), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer
.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules
%2F.
3. 2013 SSBI, supra note 2, at 6.
4. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 3 ("In 1986, only three boards (or only 3% of the
100 boards reviewed) had the chairman/CEO as the sole insider. Today, the CEO is the
sole insider on more than half of the S&P 500 boards.").
5. See generally Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465
(2007) (arguing that the rise of independent boards correlates with the shift towards the
primacy of shareholder value). Whether or not majority independent boards lead to better
corporate performance has been debated for decades. While earlier studies found mixed
evidence of whether majority independent boards improve accounting performance, they
found support that majority independent boards tended to be more active in replacing
failing CEOs, among other things. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance,54 BUs. LAW. 921, 924,
933 (1999) (finding that "boards with at least 60% independent directors are more likely"
to replace CEOs, and that independent directors may help control financial fraud). For
recent studies showing similar results, see Olubunmi Faleye, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash,
The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 160, 165-66 (2011) (showing
that improved monitoring comes at the expense of corporate performance); Lixiong Guo
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supermajority independent
boards-those
with only one
nonindependent director-do not outperform their majority
independent peers on any metric.6 In fact, studies have suggested that
"firms with supermajority-independent boards perform worse than
other firms."7 And yet, "the anti-insider movement rolls on
unchecked. "8
Critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 and the subsequent
board independence requirements that national exchanges imposed
in its aftermath have blamed legal change for the inefficient
governance structure.o Although legal mandates have not been
irrelevant, they largely ratified existing practices at the time they were
adopted." Moreover, no law, regulation, or listing standard requires
& Ronald Masulis, Board Structure and Monitoring:New Evidence from CEO Turnovers 5
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 351/2013),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2021468 (finding a positive
relationship between an independent board and the likelihood that a poorly performing
CEO is replaced).
6. See Shams Pathan & Robert Faff, Does Board Structure in Banks Really Affect
Their Performance?,37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573, 1575-76, 1581 (2013).
7. Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 950; see also David Finegold, George S. Benson
& David Hecht, Corporate Boards and Company Performance: Review of Research in
Light of Recent Reforms, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 865, 867 (2007) (providing
an overview of empirical studies that show no consistent positive correlation between
percentage of board independence and firm performance).
8. Justin Fox, Throwing Out Insiders Won't Fix Corporate Boards, HBR BLOG
NETWORK (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/fox/2012/10/throwing-outinsiders-corporate-boards.html; see also Maxwell Murphy, A "Waste of a Board Seat,"
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2012, at B1 (reporting that CFOs "serving as directors at their own
companies are a dying breed").
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 393-96 (2002); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M.
Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of
Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 51-58 (2007); Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy
Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1052-55 (2013); Roberta Romano,
Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN
U.S. REGULATION 86, 89 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over
Structure: An OrganizationalBehavior Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 261, 263-66 (2012). Even Sarbanes-Oxley agnostics have attributed the
trend towards supermajority independence to legal mandates. See Afra Afsharipour, A
Shareholders' Put Option: Counteractingthe Acquirer Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 1018, 1066 (2012).
11. By 2002, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required public companies to have a fully
independent audit committee, 97% of the S&P 500 companies already complied. SPENCER
STUART, 2007 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 9 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 SSBI],
available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBIFINAL.pdf. By 2004,
when listing standards mandated a majority independent board, 80% of companies
already complied. SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 8 (2009),
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that public company boards appoint only independent directors or
separate the roles of the chairman and the CEO.12 Change has
continued in unregulated space.13
That the trend towards more independent boards has continued
in the absence of evidence that it improves corporate performance or
reduces wrongdoing presents a puzzle that academic commentators
have struggled to explain. Two competing theories have been
advanced. Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black attributed the
trend to the conventional wisdom that the proportion of independent
directors on the corporate board and firm performance are positively
correlated.14 They shepherded considerable evidence to demonstrate
that increased independence in fact reduced firm performance and
proposed that firms nominate fewer independent directors.'" Writing
nearly a decade later, Professor Jeffrey Gordon proposed a
competing theory.'" He argued that the independence trend is a
positive development made possible by better securities disclosure
and the rise of shareholder primacy as the goal of corporate
governance. Independent boards "enhance the fidelity of managers
to shareholder objectives."'" As all companies become better
managed, empirical studies comparing performance between
companies cannot identify differences with sufficient confidence. 9
According to Gordon, increasingly independent boards are an
efficient adjustment to the change in circumstances.2 0
Fifteen years have passed since Bhagat and Black published their
study, enough time for hard evidence to overcome, or at least
[hereinafter 2009 SSBI], available at http://content.spencerstuart.comlsswebsite/pdf/lib
/SSB12009.pdf. By 2012, when independent compensation committees became legally
required, all S&P 500 companies already complied. SPENCER STUART, 2012 SPENCER
STUART BOARD INDEX 11 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 SSBI], available at
http://content.spencerstuart.comlsswebsite/pdf/lib/Spencer-Stuart-US-Board-Index2012_06Nov2012.pdf.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?,
89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 878 & n.114 (2011) (observing that despite mixed evidence on the
value of independence, corporations have been willing to embrace board reforms before
legal reforms mandated them).
14. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 942.
15. See id.
16. See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1465-66.
17. See id. at 1563.
18. Id. at 1469.
19. A rising tide of better disclosure and oversight of managers lifted all "boats" (i.e.,
reduced shirking and misconduct in all firms, not just those that have more independent
boards).
20. See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1465-66, 1509-10.
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undermine conventional wisdom, particularly when investors' money
is on the line.2 1 Yet boards have become considerably more, not less,
independent since 1999.22 And while Gordon's theory appears
accurate to a point, it "does not by itself justify the move to
supermajority independent boards." 23 The marginal benefit of adding
another independent director to a board that already has nine
appears tiny, while the marginal cost is not negligible.
This Article advances a third explanation for the ongoing
independence trend which does not supplant either theory, but
suggests that both are incomplete. Institutional investors and
corporate managers value director independence because it displaces
more meaningful reform. 24 A legal response is inevitable after
corporate scandals and crises. 25 But, the content of that regulation is
not inevitable. Investors and managers, by and large, want to prevent
regulation that would reduce stock prices, even where such regulation
would increase overall welfare.26
Shareholders (and managers whose compensation is linked to the
stock price) benefit when firms develop successful products. But
shareholders can also benefit from misconduct. Price fixing and
bribes, for example, boost stockholder returns at the expense of

21. Conventional wisdom promoted by the corporate governance industry is certainly
powerful and influential. This Article merely suggests that other factors contribute to the
entrenched independence trend.
22. See infra Table 1. In 1999, 78% of all S&P 500 board members were independent,
compared with 84% in 2012. Id. In 1999, 21% of firms had a board with only one inside
director, the CEO. Id. In 2012, 59% of firms did. Id.
23. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 462-63
(2008); see also infra Part III.A (arguing that the supermajority independence trend is a

result of institutional investor preference).
24. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 652-54 (1982) (explaining that the early proponents of
independent directors believed that they would be better than the government at
addressing negative externalities and promoting social values). Brudney concluded that it
would be unrealistic to expect independent directors to foster "social responsibility well
enough to justify eliminating or diluting regulatory controls on corporate behavior." Id. at
597.
25. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1022
(2013) (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms replaced corporate self-regulation
with federal regulation in the aftermath of accounting scandals). See generally STUART
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL

ROOTS, 1690-1860 (1998) (tracing the cyclical nature of financial regulation through the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
26. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why
FinancialReform Tends to Be Frustratedand Systemic Risk Perpetuated,97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1019, 1030 (2012) (explaining that after enactment of legislation industry attempts to

diminish the impact of reforms).
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consumers and competitors.2 7 Similarly, excessively risky strategies
transfer wealth to shareholders at the expense of creditors and
employees; shareholders receive all of the upside if the strategy
succeeds, but do not bear the full cost of the downside if it does not.28
Finally, even though shareholders do not benefit from fraud, they are
unwilling to spend enough to prevent or discover fraud.29
Director independence thus serves an important political goal by
deflecting substantive regulation that might limit rent-seeking or
force firms to internalize fully the costs of their activities, whether
legal or illegal. It is a rational political strategy for institutional
investors and managers to trade marginal decreases in corporate
performance for the reduced risk of costlier substantive regulation.30
Part I introduces the puzzle. It presents evidence of the ongoing
trend towards increasingly independent corporate boards, followed
by a literature review reflecting increasingly negative scholarly
thought and empirical evidence on supermajority independent
boards.
The apparent contradiction begets two questions that Parts II
and III discuss in turn: whether the trend is the result of investors'
preferences, and if so, why would investors want increasingly
independent boards in the absence of empirical support that they
improve corporate performance? Part II first reviews institutional
27. Recent studies estimate that 14.5% of public firms are manipulating their earnings
at any point in time, and 22.9% of firms pay significant bribes. See Alexander Dyck, Adair
Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 1 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/F_412-13_MORSE.pdf; Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The
Economics of Foreign Bribery: Evidence from FCPA Enforcement Actions 28 (July 29,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=1573222. Most are never caught and sanctioned, yielding investors
considerable returns in the process. See Karpoff et al., supra, at 28 (estimating that the
probability of getting caught paying a bribe is 6.4%).
28. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2011).
29. Ultimately, however, cost-cutting on compliance and providing incentives to
employees to produce growth result in illegality. As I showed in previous work, fraud
harms employees, suppliers, rivals, and government. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of
Securities Fraud,54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1887, 1887-88 (2013).
30. The Volcker Rule is an example of substantive regulation that managers and
investors want to avoid at all cost. If given the choice, financial firms would prefer an
independent risk committee to the Volcker Rule. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). See generally COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE
TREADWAY COMM'N, BOARD RISK OVERSIGHT: A PROGRESS REPORT (2010), available
at http://www.coso.org/documents/Board-Risk-Oversight-Survey-COSO-Protiviti_001.pdf
(discussing improvements to risk oversight by corporate boards).
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investors' stated positions on preferred board composition and their
voting and nomination practices, and concludes that both are
consistent with the proposition that investors favor supermajority
independent boards. Part II then considers alternative causes of the
independence trend--changes in the legal regime, pressure by proxy
advisory firms, managerial capture, director influence, and exit by
noncompliant firms-and concludes that they, alone, cannot explain
the trend.
Part III answers the question of why rational investors might
prefer a supermajority independent board chaired by a nonexecutive
chairman. Investors want high stock prices, which result from both
increased productivity and from value transfers from noninvestors,
some efficient, others not.3 1 Delaware law is at best a weak constraint
on shareholder rent-seeking, while Congress moves faster than
Delaware and is willing to restrict such opportunities in the aftermath
of corporate scandals or financial crises.32 Investors and their selfregulatory organizations either offer independent boards as a
voluntary solution or, when a legislative intervention is inevitable,
propose that Congress require increased independence in lieu of
substantive regulation. Corporate directors overwhelmingly believe
that they are accountable to shareholders and are obligated to
increase shareholder returns." Part III also considers why the strategy
has successfully appeased nonshareholder interests. Finally, the Part
uses three examples-bribery scandals in the 1970s, accounting frauds
in the 2000s, and the financial crisis in 2008-to illustrate how
institutional investors have used independence as both a sword and a
shield against alternative laws that were considered in the aftermath
of corporate crises.
The Article concludes that independent boards are, at best, a
weak constraint on the ability of managers to impose negative
externalities on nonshareholders and a poor substitute for substantive
regulation. It argues that corporate governance mandates should be
retired, not because they are costly for shareholders, but because they
are considerably less effective than the government at resolving
negative externalities and reinforcing social values. Future financial
reform should not try to protect shareholders from management,
31. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 659 (2006) (explaining that while "shareholders
can benefit from increasing productivity, they can also benefit by transferring value from
fixed claimants to themselves").
32. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics,118 HARV. L. REv. 2491, 2495 (2005).
33. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1529 & n.259.
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from each other, and from themselves. Rather, it needs to control
externalities that investors themselves impose on others.
I. THE INDEPENDENCE PUZZLE
A majority independent board of directors is one where more
than half of the directors are independent-they have no financial or
familial ties to the firm or its management other than their
directorship.3 4 Most public companies have maintained a majority
independent board since at least the late 1980s.35
In contrast, a supermajority independent board-one with all
independent directors except for the chief executive officer-is a
recent innovation.36 Twenty-five years ago, such boards were unheard
of, and as recently as 2000, a mere fifth of public companies had a
board with only one insider. 37 By 2013, 60% of public company
boards had only one nonindependent director.38
Surprisingly, a growing body of economic research has failed to
find any statistical correlation between supermajority independent
boards and corporate profitability or the likelihood of misconduct,
leading academics and policy makers to question their value. This
Part sets out the two basic elements of the puzzle: the observed trend
towards increasingly independent boards and the growing academic
consensus that supermajority independent boards do result in greater
corporate profitability.
A.

The Trend Towards Increasingly Independent Boards

Corporate boards during the first half of the twentieth century
were made up of company employees and outside directors, who
were also affiliated with the firm, usually as the firm's bankers,
lawyers, and suppliers.39 As late as 1950, insiders made up half of
board members, but independent (as opposed to affiliated) directors

34. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 2, § 303A.02. Significant stock
ownership is usually not a bar, since independence from management is the primary
concern. The NYSE listing standards provide one good example of independence
standards.
35. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1474.
36. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 923. Bhagat and Black consider boards with
one or two inside directors as supermajority independent. Since their seminal 1999 article,
the number of boards with a single inside director has nearly tripled, hence the
redefinition of the term "supermajority independent board" in this Article.
37. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 8.
38. See 2013 SSBI, supra note 2, at 4.
39. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1513.
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were still relatively rare.4 The number of insiders sitting on corporate
boards declined steadily from the mid-1970s and fell precipitously
towards the end of the century. 4 1 A typical public board today has ten
or eleven members, and only one of them is an insider: the chief
executive officer.42 Moreover, in a growing minority of firms, the
CEO no longer chairs the board, sets the agenda, or leads the
discussion.4 3
Supermajority independent boards are a relatively recent
phenomenon. In 1986, the CEO was the only nonindependent
director in 3% of S&P 500 firms." By 1997, that number increased to
23%, while another 33% of firms had boards with two inside
directors.45 The trend accelerated after the turn of the millennium. By
2013, the CEO was the only nonindependent director in 60% of S&P
500 firms.46 The trend is not limited to S&P 500 companies, however.
Medium-sized and small public firms are reporting similar trends.47

40. See id. at 1474-75. Between 1950 and 1970, about 20% of directors were
independent. See id.
41. See id.
42. See 2013 SSBI, supra note 2, at 6 (showing that the CEO is the only
nonindependent director in 60% of firms, that the average board has 10.7 members, and
that 84% of boards have twelve or fewer members).
43. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 23, 27.
44. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 3.
45. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 921-22.
46. See 2013 SSBI, supra note 2, at 4. If the trend were to continue at the pace set
since 1997, all corporate boards would be fully independent save for the CEO by 2028 (the
calculation is made based on the linear regression of data points for each year: y = 2.6132x
+ 15.6 (R2 = 0.9641)). Extrapolating from known data to predict the future is a dangerous
game. It is plausible that the number will plateau or reverse. Or, we might begin to see the
next frontier: completely independent boards. See Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1071.
47. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REv. 987, 1024
(2010).
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Table 1: Board Independence 1997-201348

1997

23

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

1998

23

12

78

16

n/a

1999

21

11.8

78

20

n/a

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

22
27
31
35
39
39
39
43
44
50
53
57
59
60

11.5
11.1
10.9
10.9
10.8
10.7
10.7
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.7
10.7
10.7
10.7

78
77
79
79
80
80
81
81
82
82
84
84
84
85

23
26
25
23
26
29
33
35
39
37
40
41
43
45

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
9
9
10
13
16
16
19
21
23
25

As the share of firms with only one nonindependent director on
its board has tripled, the size of the average board itself has declined
over the last twenty years, from fourteen directors to fewer than
eleven.4 9 The decline in average board size suggests that firms are
both replacing inside directors with independent directors and letting
inside directors retire without replacement.o
Independent directors dominate oversight committees. In 2006,
the compensation and audit committees in all surveyed S&P 500 firms
were fully independent, and the nominating committees of those
48. Data is derived from a survey of company proxy statements as compiled by the
Spencer Stuart Board Index from 2007 until 2013. See, e.g., 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 8
("As always, this year's Spencer Stuart Board Index is based on our analysis of the most
recent proxy reports from the S&P 500, plus an extensive supplemental survey."). Figure
1, For 1997 figures, see Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 922 tbl.1A.
49. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 10; SPENCER STUART, 2003 SPENCER STUART
BOARD INDEX 6 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SSBI] (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). See infra Table 1.
50. While retirements could explain the rising share of boards with one insider
between 1997 and 2004, they do not explain the trend from 2004 onwards; board size has
remained stable, while the share of firms with a supermajority independent board of
directors increased by half-from 39% in 2004 to 59% in 2012. See infra Table 1.
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same firms were 99% independent.51 To be sure, perfect committee
independence today is a function of the exchange listing standards,

but the trend predates the mandate.52 Table 1 provides additional
detail.
Figure 1: Board Independence 1997-2013
70

-

60

-_---------

5 0

- - - ---

40

---

--

..--

- - - - - -

-

30

T, 'fl

'C5'
T

T
V T

N %firms with CEO as only nonindependent director
a %firms that separate CEO/board chair positions
0 %firms with independent board chair

51. See SPENCER STUART, 2011 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 9 (2011)
[hereinafter 2011 SSBI], available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib
/SSBI 2011 final.pdf.
52. Since 2004, the NYSE has required listed companies to maintain fully
independent nominating, compensation, and audit committees. See NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 303A.4-7; Order Approving NASD and NYSE
Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,17678 (Nov. 12, 2003) (noting that while the NYSE required committees, NASDAQ allowed
companies to forego nominating and compensation committees and instead defer
decisions to the full board that had to be majority independent).
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Splitting the role of the board chair and the CEO has been on
the agenda of shareholder activists for some time, but progress was
initially slow: between 1998 and 2003 the percentage of boards with
separate roles for chairman and CEO only rose 7%, from 16% to
23%." It is difficult to unseat an active CEO, so most companies wait
until transition.5 4 By 2013, however, 45% of boards had separated the
two positions.
The independence trend shows no signs of slowing down. The
following Section canvasses academic literature which to date has
failed to find evidence that supermajority independent boards
increase corporate performance.
B.

If Majority Independent Boards Are Good, Are Supermajority
Independent Ones Better?

Academic commentators generally agree that majority
independent boards are a good thing, certainly better than their
insider-dominated peers. 56 Majority independent boards appear to be
more responsive to shareholder concerns than ones staffed mostly
with insiders, and more willing to fire underperforming executives,
control their pay, and reduce self-dealing."

53. 2003 SSBI, supra note 49, at 8.
54. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting that 82% of boards split the roles as
a result of CEO transition, and 12% did so because of pressure from shareholders).
55. See 2013 SSBI, supra note 2, at 5. A little over half of nonexecutive chairmen are
independent (23% of all firms). See id. Commentators have recognized the information
gap as the biggest downside to increased independence. But, it appears that outside
directors are bridging the gap, at least to some extent. In 20% of large public firms, the
lead independent director has the primary responsibility to develop the agenda for board
meetings. In 20% of firms, an independent director is principally responsible for
determining whether information received from management is timely, accurate, and
sufficient. Id. at 27.
56. See, e.g., I AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) (recommending that "[t]he board of
every large publicly held corporation ... should have a majority of directors who are free
of any significant relationship ... with the corporation's senior executives"); MELVIN A.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170 (1976);
Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1488 (1993).
But see Bainbridge,supra note 10, at 393 (mentioning the mixed results that accompany
independent boards).
57. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation,98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1292-94
(1998). Responsiveness is a relative term that obscures a fair amount of slack and
opportunity for the board to shirk or be bribed. See Steve Stecklow, Outside Directors'
Options Role Is Cited in Backdating Study, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2006, at B3 ("The study
is notable because it suggests that outside, or independent, directors-who are supposed
to play a special role safeguarding against cozy board relationships with management-
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In contrast, virtually all academic commentators view
supermajority independent boards as too much of a good thing. 8
Although, at least in theory, wholly independent boards might be
marginally more willing than only majority independent boards to fire
a failing chief executive or stop fraud, they are less able to do so
because their independence renders them unaware of the problem.59
Many believe the share of independent directors on the board and the
amount of relevant information that the board possesses are inversely
correlated. 60 As the board reaches the majority independence mark,
the marginal cost of the diminishing quality of information exceeds
the marginal benefit of increased independence.6 1 Adding one more
independent director to a board that already has nine such directors
(and two insiders) adds very little, but halving the number of insiders
on the board (from two to one) reduces the quality of information in
the board's hands.62
Empirical studies seem to support the theoretical intuition that
majority independent boards are a good development, but
supermajority independent ones are not. In a literature review,
Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black reported that
supermajority independent boards performed no better than merely
majority independent boards, and, by some measures, worse. 63 In

may have been co-opted in options backdating by receiving manipulated grants
themselves.").
58. This development is of relatively recent vintage. One of the first articles to
question the desirability of supermajority independent boards is Jill E. Fisch, Taking
Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997). More recent treatments include
Bainbridge, supra note 10; Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96
IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010); Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89
GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Rodrigues, supra note 23. But for empirical studies that indicate
boards wholly independent of management perform better at large, see generally Bill
Francis, Iftekhar Hasan & Qiang Wu, Do Corporate Boards Affect Firm Performance?
New Evidence from the Financial Crisis (Bank of Fin. Research Discussion Paper No.
11.2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2041194 (finding
that when independence is re-defined as outside directors who are less connected with
current CEOs, there is a positive relationship between independence and firm
performance); Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 57, at 1318 (finding that an independent
board tends to produce "superior corporate performance").
59. See Bhagat & Black, supranote 5, at 950.
60. See id.; Gordon, supra note 5, at 1541; see also Sharpe, supra note 10, at 266
(noting that independent directors "face informational disadvantages that may make it
difficult for them to evaluate management's decisions").
61. See Bhagat & Black, supranote 5, at 949.
62. The CEO is the only insider on the board who can more easily control the
information given to the board.
63. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 949.
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comparing boards with two or fewer insiders to those with three or
more, they found that those boards with more independent directors
performed worse.' The effect was quite modest, a 3.4% reduction in
return on assets, but nonetheless statistically significant.6 5 In light of
their findings, Bhagat and Black proposed that firms experiment with
more insiders on boards.' Recent empirical studies confirm Bhagat
and Black's results.67
In addition to being correlated with worse financial performance,
supermajority independent boards are less able to perform specific
tasks compared to their majority independent peers. Professors
Richard Geddes and Hrishikesh Vinod reported a curvilinear
relationship between the share of outside directors and the likelihood
of CEO termination.' Majority independent boards were more likely
to fire an underperforming chief executive than their insiderdominated peers, but boards with only one or two insiders were less

likely to do so. 69
Several studies published in the 1990s suggested that
supermajority independent boards were positively correlated with top
executive compensation (i.e., the more independent directors, the
higher the CEO's pay) as well as with compensation of other
executives at the firm, whereas the firm's subsequent performance
was negatively correlated with independence.70 In addition, the more
independent the board, the more likely the firm was to adopt a
golden parachute plan for its executives for acquisition-related

64. See id. at 947.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 951.
67. See Faleye et al., supra note 5, at 165-66 (showing that improved monitoring
comes at the expense of corporate performance); Guo & Masulis, supra note 5, at 5
(finding a positive relationship between an independent board and the likelihood that a
poorly performing CEO is replaced).
68. See R. Richard Geddes & Hrishikesh D. Vinod, CEO Age and Outside Directors:
A Hazard Analysis, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 767, 769 (1997).
69. Id. Cf Guo & Masulis, supra note 5, at 3-4 (finding a positive relationship
between an independent board and the likelihood that a poorly performing CEO is
replaced). However, directors who terminate a CEO suffer adverse labor market
consequences. Professors McDonnell and King found that they are less likely to be
appointed to another board, and that if they do find new board positions, the subsequent
boards on which they serve are "smaller and less reputable" than those that recruit their
peers who did not terminate a CEO. Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden G. King, The
Market Hates a Monitor: The Adverse Selection of Independent Directors Who Oust a
CEO 6 (July 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1893713.
70. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 931 & nn.35-38.
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terminations." Golden parachutes reduce the likelihood that
management will oppose an unsolicited takeover bid, so they may be
shareholder value-enhancing, if the payment is relatively small.72 But
this may not always be the case.73
Increasing board independence by splitting the role of the CEO
and the board chairman has likewise produced mixed results.74
Professors Reena Aggarwal, Isil Erel, Ren6 Stulz, and Rohan
Williamson found no correlation between shareholder value and
separating the two positions, while Professors Ronald Masulis, Cong
Wang, and Fei Xie found that firms where the two positions are
separated experienced higher abnormal returns on announcement of
an acquisition. 6
The Bhagat and Black survey of empirical work resonated loudly
among academic commentators. On one side of the debate,
Professors Roberta Romano and Larry Ribstein (in separate articles)
have relied squarely on Bhagat and Black's research to argue against
the independence movement and laws requiring majority
independent boards." Professors Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Romano,
along with Professor Stephen Bainbridge, have argued that legal
independence mandates forced all firms into the same mold.7 9

71. See id. at 932 & n.42.
72. See id. at 932.
73. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive
Decision-Making,and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 200-01 (1985).
74. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1798-1800 (2011).
75. See Reena Aggarwal et al., Do U.S. Firms Have the Best Corporate Governance?
A Cross-Country Examination of the Relation Between Corporate Governance and
Shareholder Wealth 19 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No.
145/2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=954169 (finding
no correlation between CEO/chair duality and shareholder wealth).
76. See Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and
Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1873-75 (2007).
77. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 5. As of February 2014, law review articles listed
as "Citing References" on Westlaw totaled 135.
78. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 26-28 (2002); Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005). I should note that Bhagat and Black's work actually supports
a legal requirement that firms maintain a majority independent board of directors. What it
does not support is requiring supermajority independence, something that no law to date
has done. See discussion infra Part II.A.
79. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project,61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1064-66 (1993); Bainbridge, supra note
74, at 1804-05; Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Perilof
CorporateGovernance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1803, 1862-63 (2008).
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Because firms are diverse and subject to a variety of accountability
mechanisms, including product markets, managerial labor markets,
external audits, and the market for corporate control, firms ought to
be allowed to adjust the board to fit their particular needs.so
Delaware Chancellors William Chandler and Leo Strine have
also cautioned against boards where the CEO is the only inside
director.81 In addition to doubting the ability of the independent
board to control managers, they noted that it might be difficult to
hold non-director officers liable in a Delaware court for breaches of
fiduciary duties.'
Supermajority independent boards have fared no better among
scholars receptive to regulatory interventions in corporate
governance. Professor Donald Langevoort has cautioned that
outsiders on the board are likely to focus excessively on monitoring
management." Since management also sits on the board, the
monitoring focus causes friction among board members.' This is
problematic because boards are also tasked with setting strategy and
advising management on acquisitions. Boards where insiders and
outsiders can work cooperatively on those tasks add value to the
company, while supermajority independent boards increase
unproductive discord on the board." Similarly, Professor Jill Fisch has
argued that managing is an important board function and that too
many outsiders on the board detract from that function. 6 Finally,
Professor Hillary Sale has observed that independent boards of
directors have failed to prevent corporate crises and scandals. The
failure of corporate self-regulation hurt shareholders and
80. See Bainbridge, supra note 79, at 1065-66; see also Adam J. Epstein, The Broken
Small-Cap Market Undermines the Recovery, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 11,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-11/the-broken-small-cap-market2013),
undermines-the-recovery ("One-size-fits-all corporate governance doesn't work because
small public companies have a fraction of the resources of their larger counterparts.").
81. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American CorporateGovernance System: PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 1002 & n.119 (2003).
82. See id. at 1003-04. The reason is that, absent some act in Delaware, its courts
might not have personal jurisdiction over remote officers. The Chancellors propose an
amendment to the Delaware Code presuming the consent of top officers to service of
process in Delaware. See id.
83. See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 801.
84. See id. at 799-80.
85. See id. at 799; see also Faleye et al., supra note 5, at 160-61 (suggesting that intense
independent monitoring negatively affects corporate productivity).
86. See Fisch, supra note 58, at 267-68.
87. See Hillary A. Sale, The New "Public" Corporation,74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 147-48 (2011).

872

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

nonshareholders." This resulted in public scrutiny and increased
demand for federal regulation of public companies.
Scholars have proposed a variety of remedies to fix the perceived
problem. In light of their findings, Professors Bhagat and Black
suggested that rational investors should resist conventional wisdom
and opt for mixed boards.8 9 In a similar vein, Professor Lisa Fairfax
recently argued in favor of increasing the number of inside directors
on the board. 90 She observed that independent directors suffer from a
"knowledge deficit" that they cannot overcome easily." In addition,
independent directors' incentives to monitor are dampened by their
limited exposure to liability and their financial, social, and structural
ties to the chief executive that they are expected to oversee and
discipline.' Inside directors, while more likely to authorize selfdealing by insiders or allow financial fraud to continue, could help the
entire board overcome the knowledge deficit that renders
supermajority independent boards less effective.9 3
Animated by concerns about the information gap facing
supermajority independent boards, Professors Kelli Alces and Nicola
Sharpe have made two radically different proposals. Convinced that
the "board of directors has outlived its purpose," Alces has advocated
abolishing the board of directors and replacing it with contractual
governance by shareholder and creditor governance agreements. 94
Sharpe, on the other hand, proposed creating independent
information channels for the independent board to bridge the
knowledge gap. 95
Finally, Professor Usha Rodrigues, who is not a proponent of
supermajority independent boards, 96 has suggested that corporate

88. See id.
89. Bhagat & Black, supra note 5, at 950.
90. See Fairfax,supra note 58, at 127.
91. Id. at 164-67. In addition to being outsiders, independent directors who live more
than 100 kilometers from the headquarters know less about the company and rely more
heavily on the stock price as the indicator of value. See Zinat S. Alam et al., Does the
Location of Directors Matter? Information Acquisition and Board Decisions, J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21, 23, 33), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571862.
92. See Fairfax,supra note 58, at 177-78.
93. See id. at 179-80.
94. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors,46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
783, 785-86 (2011).
95. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board
Power and Process,38 J. CORP. L. 1, 34-36 (2012).
96. See Rodrigues,supra note 23, at 447.
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boards be repurposed as managers of conflicts.' Rodrigues proposed
that boards should focus on one thing: approving (or rejecting)
transactions where managers have a conflict of interest, including
compensation packages, related party transactions, takeovers,
derivative litigation, and CEO removal and succession."
The trend towards greater board independence has continued
despite a substantial academic backlash against increasingly
independent boards. The contradiction raises two important
questions. First, are boards becoming more independent as a result of
investors' preferences or are other forces at work? Part II of this
Article offers evidence that institutional investors are pushing for
increased independence. Second, why would rational investors want
supermajority independent boards in the absence of empirical
evidence that it improves performance or eliminates corporate
wrongdoing? Part III argues that the increase in board independence
can be explained as a rational response by institutional investors and
corporate managers in the face of threatened regulation.
II. Do INVESTORS FAVOR INCREASED BOARD INDEPENDENCE?

Over the long term, firms tend to develop board structures that
are optimal for their circumstances.99 Within constraints, firms tend to
choose boards that maximize shareholder value." Because
supermajority independent boards do not obviously increase stock
prices or improve corporate performance,' 0' the observed trend
towards supermajority independent boards presents a puzzle, but
only if it is in fact emerging in response to investor pressure.
This Part offers evidence that supermajority independent public
boards are primarily the product of institutional investor preferences.
Other factors, including legal change, pressure by proxy advisory
firms, managerial influence, directors' own influence, and exit of
97. See Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1051-52.
98. See id. at 1052, 1070-81. Rodrigues includes the audit function among the matters
for the board. I consciously excluded it, largely because it is unclear whether and how
exactly the involvement of the independent board improves corporate disclosure (separate
from having an expert audit committee and prohibiting the provision of nonaudit
services).
99. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301,302, 313-15 (1983).
100. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The
Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 137,
182 (2012) (suggesting that legal rules on board composition may reduce stock prices
overall, but that firms will nevertheless adapt to limit the stock price decline).
101. See supranote 6-7 and accompanying text.
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noncompliant firms have also contributed to the already strong
underlying trend.
A. Boards Have Changed Because That Is What Investors Want
Market forces appear to be the main drivers of change in board
composition. Regulatory independence mandates implemented since
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act merely ratified preexisting corporate
norms.'02 Institutional investors, including pension funds, mutual
funds, and hedge funds, have demonstrated a healthy and sustained
3 This Section surveys institutional
appetite for governance changes."o
investors' written corporate governance policies and their voting
practices to conclude that the ongoing independence trend is one that
institutional investors have favored.
1. Institutional Investors' Written Policies
The largest of American public firms have been majority owned
by institutional investors for decades. By the early 1990s, institutional
investors held 55% of stock in the one hundred largest public firms."
Households (a term that includes hedge funds)' currently own
directly 38% of corporate equities, federal and state governments
own less than 0.6%, while institutional investors-mutual funds,
private and public pension funds, life insurance companies, and
exchange-traded funds-own the balance: about one-half of all
outstanding corporate stock.o" Thus, a survey of the largest
institutional investors' corporate governance policies is a useful
starting point to investigate whether institutional investors favor
supermajority independent boards in publicly traded companies.
The Investment Company Institute ("ICI") is a trade group
representing mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, and

102. See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 923, 930 (2010) (book review); Gordon, supra note 5, at 1471; Kahan & Rock, supra
note 47, at 1022-23.
103. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 995-1007.
104. See CAROLYN K. BRANCATO & PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE tbl.19 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law,
Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, 1991) (reporting that institutions held 54.8% of 100 largest
U.S. companies).
105. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 997 (explaining that hedge funds do not have
to disclose their positions and thus are counted in the residual category of "households").
106. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED
MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS THIRD QUARTER 2013, at 100 (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zl.pdf.
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exchange-traded funds that together manage more than $16 trillion
and serve more than ninety million investors." The ICI has endorsed
board independence as the preferred governance strategy, but its
corporate governance policies do not advocate supermajority
independence. 10s
The Council of Institutional Investors ("CII"), a non-profit
association of 125 pension funds-including United Auto Workers
Retirement System
and the California State Teachers'
benefit funds, foundations, and
("CalSTRS")'"-employee
endowments, representing more than $3 trillion in assets, has
promoted strong corporate governance since its establishment in
1985.110 In its Corporate Governance Policies, it recommends that
public company boards be at least two-thirds independent."' The CII
recommends that an independent director chair the board." 2
Furthermore, if the roles of the CEO and chairman are combined,
CII recommends that the board should appoint a lead independent
director."'
The California Public Employees' Retirement System
("CalPERS") is the nation's largest pension fund and one that is very
active on governance matters." 4 For a period, CalPERS advocated
that "the only company executive on the board should be the chief

107. See About ICI, INV. CO. INST., http://www.ici.org/about-ici (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
108. See INv. Co. INST., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO MEMBERS 2 (2012), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/12-ici-annual.pdf; Letter from Dorothy Donahue, Deputy Gen.
Counsel of Sec. Regulation, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y of the SEC (Nov. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/26634.pdf (endorsing a proposed NASDAQ rule
requiring independent compensation committees).
109. CalSTRS, the largest teachers' retirement fund in the United States,
independently endorses board independence. In its corporate governance principles, it
threatens to withhold votes from directors who sit on boards that are not "[a]t least twothirds" independent. CALSTRS, CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 3 (2011), http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files
/file-attachments/corporate-governance-principles-1.pdf.
110. About Us, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/about_us
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
111. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICIES 3 (2012), available at http://www.cii.org/files/ciicorporategovernancepolicies
/09_27_13%20CII%2OCorp%2OGov%20Policies%2OFull%20and%20Current%20%20FI
NAL.pdf.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See CalPERS Investments, CALPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=
/investments/home.xml (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
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executive,""' but has since abandoned this position. In its current
corporate governance principles, CalPERS recommends that a
"substantial majority" of board members be independent, but does
not define the term." 6 It also advocates the appointment of an
independent chairman. 1 7
Similarly, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College
Retirement Equities Fund ("TIAA-CREF"), which manages almost
$600 billion in assets,"' recommends that boards of its portfolio
companies "be composed of a substantial majority of independent
directors."" 9 Its chief investment counsel explained in 2005 that board
independence was one of the issues that mattered most to the fund.120
Vanguard, a family of investment funds, and the Business
Roundtable, an association of chief executives, recommend that a
"substantial majority" of directors be independent.12' Fidelity and T.
Rowe Price, two major families of investment and mutual funds,
merely require that the board of its portfolio companies be majority

independent.122
Corporate governance policies of high-volume institutional
investors suggest that they favor substantially independent boards,

115. The FadingAppeal of the Boardroom, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/559111; Adam Bryant, Calpers Draws a Blueprint for
its Concept of an Ideal Board,N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at D1.
116. See CAL. PUB. EMPL. RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 (2011), available at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs
/about/board-cal-agenda/agendas/invest/201111/itemO3b.pdf.
117. See id.
118. As of June 30, 2013, TIAA-CREF managed $542 billion for 4.8 billion people.
About TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF, https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about-us/who-we-areat-tiaa-cref (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
119. TIAA-CREF,
TIAA-CREF
POLICY
STATEMENT
ON
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 15 (6th ed.), available at https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/pdf/pdf
/governance-policyl.pdf.
120. See SPENCER STUART, 2005 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 23 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 SSBI], available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib
/SSBI-2005.pdf. The counsel noted that TIAA-CREF frequently communicates directly
with the board of directors, circumventing management. See id.
121. See Our Views on Corporate Governance at the Companies in Which We Invest,
VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/corporate-governance/
(last

visited

Feb.

23,

2014);

BuS.

ROUNDTABLE,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE 2012, at 14 (2012), available at http://www.alcoa.com/globallen/about
_alcoalcorp-gov/PDFs/BRT_2012_- Principles-ofCorpGovernance.pdf.
122. See Proxy Voting Policies, T. ROWE PRICE, http://corporate.troweprice.com/ccw
/home/responsibility/conductingBusinessResponsibly/proxyVotingPolicies.do (last visited
Guidelines, FIDELITY,
Voting
Feb.
23,
2014);
Fidelity Funds' Proxy
http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml#su
mmary (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
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though not necessarily boards with only one inside director and
chaired by an independent director.
2. Voting Patterns and Nomination Practices
Institutional investors' corporate governance policies are only
the beginning of the investigation into their actual preferences.
Shareholders express their preferences in two other ways: by casting
votes in director elections and by influencing nominating committees
that select board nominees.
a.

DirectorElections

Many factors influence outcomes in director elections: the
nomination process, whether the board elections are staggered, the
presence of majority voting for directors, and the distribution of
voting power, to name a few. In most companies, directors are subject
to re-election annually, but in companies with staggered boards,
generally only one-third of directorships turn over each year.123
Plurality voting used to be the norm.124 Most directors run unopposed,
so a director could be elected if she received a single vote in her
favor. Between 2003 and 2009, however, majority voting replaced
plurality voting in virtually all public firms.125 It is now standard for
company bylaws to require that director nominees receive a majority
shareholder vote in favor to be elected or re-elected.126 Directors who
fail to receive majority support must offer their resignation to the
board.127 In 2011, 2% of directors who left the board did so for failing
to secure a majority vote.128
Although the word "election" suggests democratic contest,
individuals that firms nominate for directorships rarely face
competition. Between 1996 and 2005, there were only 118 contested
elections (out of several thousand public companies), and of those,

123. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011) (allowing corporations to stagger
board elections every two or three years). To this author's knowledge, the norm for
staggered boards is a three-year election cycle.
124. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1010. If there are as many nominees as there
are open seats, theoretically a candidate can be elected with a single vote in favor and one
hundred million against or abstaining. See id. at 1010 & n.149.
125. See id. at 1011 (reporting that 10% of companies had a majority vote in place in
2003, but 90% did in 2009).
126. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 15. In 2012, 83% of S&P 500 companies had a
destaggered board, 40% more than in 2002, while 84% had majority vote policies. See id.
127. Id.
128. 2011 SSBI, supra note 51, at 12.
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the rivals succeeded only one-third of the time. 29 More recent data
suggests that proxy contests have been more common and marginally
more successful in the wake of the financial crisis, but remain rare in
the aggregate.'30
The average election thus features as many nominees as there
are open seats, and the median nominee receives 97% of the vote.' 3'
Professors Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan found that
89% of directors received more than 90% of the vote.132 The
remaining 10% were directors in poorly governed firms, those who
missed more than a quarter of board meetings, and those disfavored

by proxy advisory firms.133
The evidence suggests that shareholders appear to support
directors that the firms nominate by large margins. It is worth
repeating, however, that firms ordinarily nominate only as many
directors as there are open seats and that proxy fights are rare. As a
result, shareholders are not choosing independent directors over
insiders at the election stage. Instead, decisions about board
composition are made at the nomination stage.

129. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 677, 686 (2007).
130. The 2011 Georgeson corporate governance report includes thirteen contests for
director nominees, and the 2010 and 2009 reports feature between 20 and 30 contests.
GEORGESON, 2011 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEw 50-51, available at
http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20111129-Georgeson.pdf.
131. Jie Cai, Jaqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors,64 J. FIN.
2389, 2397 (2009). The lopsided election results are the product of several confounding
factors. The absence of alternatives is one. The second factor is the presence of brokers'
discretionary voting. Under NYSE Rule 452, brokers could vote shares in their customer
accounts in routine matters, unless beneficial owners directed them otherwise. The NYSE
deemed uncontested director elections to be routine, and brokers tended to vote shares in
favor of the slate of directors that the firm proposed. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at
1015. On average, brokers voted between 13% and 19% of outstanding shares. See id. at
1017 & n.194 (attributing the figure to Broadridge Financial, offered during SEC
testimony on broker votes); Cai et al., supra, at 2415. Since most directors are elected with
wide margins, the broker vote was rarely outcome determinative: excluding uninstructed
shares voted by brokers, the median nominee still received 93.8% of votes in favor. Id. at
2416. The practice ended in 2010 when amendments to NYSE Rule 452 deeming all
director elections "nonroutine" went into effect. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at
1016-17.
132. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 888 (2010).
133. See Cai et al., supra note 131, at 2416-17.

2014]
b.

BOARD INDEPENDENCE

879

Nomination Practices

Managers used to control the nomination process: chief
executives "hand-picked" directors." If directors rocked the boat,
they were certain to be asked to leave.' A lot has changed.
A corporate governance expert and activist, Nell Minow,
observed in 2004 that investors are beginning to influence board
composition, stating, "When a company is having significant trouble,
... [investors] are not going to focus on secondary items, but will go

to where the money is, which is who is on the board and who gets to
decide who is on the board.""'
Large investors are asking to be part of the nomination process.
They have become more aggressive in recommending board members
or alternative slates, but have stopped short of initiating proxy
battles.'37 Instead, they have pressured nominating committees to
conduct an external search for directors.138 In response, nominating
committees are relying less on insiders and more on external sources
for recommendations of new directors.139 Companies are
preemptively reaching out to institutional investors and large
shareholders to discuss governance matters, including director
nominees. In 2008, 45% of companies reported reaching out regularly
to their twenty to twenty-five largest shareholders to discuss board
matters, from executive compensation to board composition.140 By
2012, that share increased to 60%.141
Since 2004, NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards have required
that independent directors, not the entire board, manage the
nomination process. 4 2 In 2004, the SEC adopted detailed new rules
that require disclosure of nominating committee practices, including
the committees' process for search and evaluation of director
candidates and the process for vetting candidates suggested by
134. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 989, 992.
135. See id. at 992.
136. SPENCER STUART, 2004 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2004), available at
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/liblSSBI-2004.pdf
(internal
quotation
marks omitted).
137. See 2009 SSBI, supra note 11, at 2.
138. See SPENCER STUART, 2008 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 4 (2008)
[hereinafter 2008 SSBI], available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib
/SSBI_08.pdf.
139. See id. at 5.
140. See id. at 28.
141. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 32. In 2010 and 2011, the respective percentages
were 53% and 56%. 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 31; 2011 SSBI, supra note 51, at 31.
142. See sources cited supra note 51.
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shareholders.'43 An increasing percentage of firms have also disclosed
the sources of director nominees.1 " In 2005, external search firms
accounted for 56% of newly appointed directors, independent
directors contributed another 19% of nominees, while insiders
(including controlling shareholders) initially recommended 23% of
newly elected directors. 14 5 Since then, the relative share of successful
nominees by insiders has declined further.14 6
It appears that the board of directors, and not management, is
increasingly in control of the nomination process. Under close
investor scrutiny and pressure, boards are nominating independents
over insiders for directorships.' 47
B.

Alternative Explanations

Institutional investors' corporate governance policies and
practices leave some room for the possibility that they would prefer
more mixed boards. This Section examines other plausible
explanations: legal change, pressure from proxy advisory firms,
managerial capture, directors' own preferences, and sorting-exit
from public markets by noncompliant firms. The Section concludes
that none of the alternative explanations undermines the primary
explanation offered in this Article, namely that institutional investors
have propelled the supermajority independence trend.
1. The Role of Legal Mandates
Corporate law and, more controversially, federal securities
regulation require and encourage some degree of independence on
corporate boards. This Section describes these laws and concludes
that legal change, alone, does not explain the trend.

143. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8340,
Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 68 Fed.
Reg. 66,992 (Nov. 28, 2003); see also NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 2,
§ 303A.02 (defining independent director).
144. 2005 SSBI, supra note 120, at 8 (reporting a source for about one-third of
nominees); 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 13 (reporting a source for half of new directors).
145. 2005 SSBI, supra note 120, at 8.
146. See 2007 SSBI, supra note 11, at 5 (reporting that insiders recommended 19% of
nominated directors).
147. Some firms have affirmative rules in place requiring that the board have no more
than one nonindependent director. See Murphy, supra note 8, at B1 (including AOL, Inc.,
among them).
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CorporateLaw

The debate about independent boards focuses almost exclusively
on boards of listed companies,148 the majority of which are
incorporated in Delaware and subject to Delaware corporate law.149
The first Delaware general incorporation statute, adopted in 1899,
gave boards of directors the authority and the responsibility to run
the corporation."so The board, not the managers, was the "ultimate
managerial authority in the corporation,""' and could not delegate its
authority to another corporate body.' 52
The 1974 amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law
provided that the business of the corporation be managed by or
"under the direction of" the board of directors.' The amendment
reflected the changed reality of public boards, where insiders were no
longer in the majority.154 Although Delaware law requires that all
corporations have a board of directors regardless of size or ownership
structure, it gives them considerable freedom to design a board to fit
their needs.' As a result, one sees a fair degree of variation between
private and public corporate boards in size, composition, and
responsibilities.'56
148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149. See About Agency, DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.corp.delaware.gov
/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) ("More than 50% of all publicly-traded
companies in the United States, including 64% of the Fortune 500, have chosen Delaware
as their legal home.").
150. Delaware General Corporation Law of 1899, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws 444, 451 (1899)
(requiring that a board of no fewer than three directors manage the business of the
corporation).
151. Fisch, supranote 58, at 272.
152. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation,50 MD.
L. REV. 80, 93 & n.52 (1991) ("Early statutes absolutely required that corporations be
managed by the board of directors . . . .").
153. See GEN. CORP. LAW COMM. OF THE DEL. STATE BAR ASS'N, COMMENTARY ON
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE 127TH GEN. ASSEMBLY SECOND SESSION, 1974, 2d

Sess.
(Del.
1974)
available at
http://law.widener.edulLawLibrary/Research
/OnlineResources/DelawareResources/DelawareCorporationLawDocuments.aspx.
154. See Kenneth M. Lehn, Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Determinants of the Size
and Composition of US Corporate Boards: 1935-2000, 38 FIN. MGMT. 747, 768 (2009);
Gordon, supra note 5, at 1475.
155. Close corporations are the exception: shareholders have the option of foregoing
the board of directors and managing the corporation directly, though few choose to do so.
Family corporations seeking tax advantaged status (S-Corporations) are the most common
to use the close corporation, though even they usually choose to appoint a board of
directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2011). Delaware law limits the number of
shareholders in a close corporation to thirty and requires that share transferability be
restricted. Id. § 342.
156. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, FinancialContracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD.
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Delaware corporate law does not require independent
directors.' It does, however, encourage boards to have disinterested
directors, usually firm outsiders. If disinterested directors approve a
self-dealing transaction, such as a generous CEO compensation
package, they shield the firm from subsequent legal attack.1 8
Similarly, Delaware courts defer to outside directors' judgment in
"freeze-outs," where a controlling shareholder of a public company
buys out minority shareholders,' so long as the process they adopted
appears appropriate.16 0 Independent directors also act as gatekeepers
to shareholder derivative litigation. A shareholder cannot sue
directors or officers for breaches of fiduciary duties of loyalty or care
on behalf of the corporation without first demanding that the board
file the lawsuit."' An independent board or board committee can
refuse to do so, effectively stopping litigation, and reviewing courts
generally grant the board's decision wide business judgment
deference. 62
By insulating board decisions made by disinterested directors
from judicial review, Delaware law encourages boards to become
more independent. But, this corner of Delaware law is settled and has
been settled for decades. Change in corporate law cannot explain the

281, 288 (2003) (reporting that the average board of a VC-backed private company has six
members, 23% of whom are outside directors). See generally Brian J. Broughman,
Independent Directorsand Shared Board Control in Venture Finance, 9 REV. L. & ECON.
41 (2013) (describing the categories of problems that arise on boards of VC-backed
private firms).
157. See § 141(b) (listing the requirements for a corporate board of directors).
158. See id. § 144(a)(1). This was not always the case. Early corporate law provided
that any transaction between the corporation and its officers and directors was voidable by
the shareholders or the corporation. See James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring
Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2003).
159. Professor Subramanian describes a freeze-out as "a transaction in which a
controlling shareholder buys out the minority shareholders in a publicly traded
corporation for cash or the controller's stock." Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts,
115 YALE L.J. 2, 5 n.1 (2005).
160. See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 709-11 (Del. 1983).
161. See McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931) ("[A] stockholder cannot be
permitted ... to invade the discretionary field committed to the judgment of the directors
and sue in the corporation's behalf when the managing body refuses.").
162. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807-08 (Del. 1984). Only if shareholders can
show that the majority of the board was not disinterested can they proceed with the
lawsuit. See id. at 814. Alternatively, shareholders can show demand futility by showing
that the transaction itself was an invalid exercise of business judgment. See id. Even if
demand is excused and the derivative action is not dismissed, the board can form a special
litigation committee composed of disinterested directors, who can move to dismiss the
derivative lawsuit. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-86 (Del. 1981).
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change in board composition that has occurred over the last twentyfive years. 63
b.

FederalSecurities Regulation

Relatively recent changes to federal securities laws and listing
standards have imposed a legal requirement that public companies
maintain majority independent boards and fully independent audit,
nominating, and compensation committees.'
Securities regulation historically governed the sale of securities
to the public, and said very little about corporate internal affairs. Like
Delaware, however, federal regulators and stock exchanges began
encouraging some degree of director independence forty years ago.16 1
In the 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission first endorsed
the creation of audit committees composed of outside directors in
publicly held companies,16 and later required public companies to
disclose their audit committee composition.167 Since 1978, the New
York Stock Exchange has required all listed companies to have an
audit committee composed of non-management members.168 Since
163. This is not to suggest that Delaware legal doctrine has not changed over the last
twenty-five years; it has changed. Delaware courts have fleshed out fiduciary duties, in
particular by making it clear that acting in bad faith exposes directors to liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). The courts
have explained that shareholders cannot adopt bylaw amendments that would interfere
with directors' fiduciary obligations. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008). The courts and the legislature have further reinforced the law
of mergers and acquisitions, generally deferring to decisions of disinterested directors. See,
e.g., In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502 (Del. Ch. 2013). Perhaps the most
important development is the majority voting rule, discussed in more detail supra in Part
II.A.2. The Delaware legislature changed the General Corporation Law to prohibit boards
from amending shareholder bylaw proposals adopting majority voting for directors. See
Act of June 27, 2006, ch. 306, sec. 5, § 216, 75 Del. Laws 400, 400 (2006) (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011)).
164. See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1482-83; supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.
165. See P.M. Vasudev, CorporateLaw and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 242 (2010). The United States has been debating whether the federal
government should be involved in chartering corporations since its founding. James
Madison proposed federal chartering during deliberations in the Continental Congress.
See id.
166. See Standing Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, 37 Fed. Reg.
6850 (Mar. 23, 1972).
167. See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of
Directors,34 Bus. LAW. 1837, 1839 (1979).
168. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1519. Even then, the requirement merely ratified
existing reality. The Conference Board found that in 1967, 19% of manufacturing
companies and 31% of nonmanufacturing companies had an audit committee. By 1977,
the shares increased to 93% and 94%, respectively. See id. at n.211 (citing JEREMY
BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTlCES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF
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1993, Congress has barred public corporations from deducting
compensation paid to executives in excess of $1 million on the
corporate tax return, unless the compensation is contingent on
meeting performance goals and a determination by a compensation
committee "comprised solely of 2 or more outside directors" that
those goals were in fact met.' 69 The federal statute did not require
corporations to have independent directors, but their absence
deprived the firm of a valuable tax deduction.
Everything changed after the rash of accounting scandals in 2001
and 2002.170 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress authorizes the
SEC to prohibit exchanges from listing securities of issuers without
fully independent audit committees,"' and the SEC adopted Rule
1OA-3 in 2003.172 In addition, and at the SEC's urging, both the NYSE
and NASDAQ revised their listing standards to require that listed
corporations have a majority independent board of directors." Since
2004, both NYSE and NASDAQ have also required that
compensation and nomination decisions be made by independent
directors or committees.174
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted another wave of
lawmaking. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 directed the SEC to
prohibit exchanges from listing securities of issuers without fully
independent compensation committees.1 7 The SEC complied in June
2012,76 though by that point, the exchanges had already required that
compensation be approved by independent decision-makers for the
better part of the decade.177
THE BOARD 50 (1973) (Conf. Bd. Report No. 588); ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws,
CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 BuS. LAW. 1591, 1644 (1978)).
169. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 13211,
§ 162, 107 Stat. 312, 469-470 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i) (2012)).
170. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 25, at 1022-23 (describing the significance of the
change).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012).
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2013).
173. See supra note 52.
174. See Order Approving NASD and NYSE Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,176-78 (Nov. 4, 2003).
175. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 952,124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012)).
176. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1.
177. The NYSE rules were first approved in 2002. NYSE, Inc., Corporate Governance
Rule ProposalsReflecting Recommendations from the NYSE CorporateAccountability and
Listing StandardsCommittee as Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors,August 1, 2002
(2002), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-pro -b.pdf. Until recently, NASDAQ did not
require firms to have a standing compensation and nominating committee. Instead,
independent directors could approve executive compensation packages or nominate
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Although federal mandates appear restrictive, they merely
codified existing practices at the time they were adopted. By 2001, a
large majority of public companies had independent board
majorities"' and nearly all had fully independent audit committees. 9
Similarly, Dodd-Frank's requirement that firms have a fully
independent compensation committee has been common practice
since the mid-1990s.s 0 More importantly, no federal law or regulation
requires or encourages companies to put in place a supermajority
independent board of directors, and section 972 of the Dodd-Frank
Act merely instructs the SEC to require disclosure as to whether the
CEO is also the chairman of the board or not. 8 1 Boards have
continued to become increasingly independent in the space that has
remained unregulated.18 2
2. Proxy Advisors
An additional explanation for the impetus towards board
independence is that proxy advisory firms, on whom institutional
investors rely for advice on how to vote, have aggressively promoted
greater board independence. Proxy advisory firms make
directors by a majority vote. In addition, in exceptional and limited circumstances, a
compensation or nominating committee could have one member that was not
independent. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance,
Exchange Act Release No. 34,48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
178. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to
Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 896 & n.33 (2002) (citing INVESTOR
RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., BOARD PRACTICES/BOARD PAY 2001: THE
STRUCTURE AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500
COMPANIES (2002)).
179. In fact, the NYSE has required that the audit committee be fully independent
since 1977, though the definition of independence was more relaxed at the time and did
not include bankers, underwriters, or others with customary relationships with the firm.
See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1479-80.
180. Companies began instituting fully independent compensation committees in 1996
to take advantage of section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code that disallowed a
deduction of executive compensation unless performance-based and approved by a fully
independent audit committee. See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1480.
181. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2012)). As of
February 13, 2014, the SEC had not proposed a rule. See Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act-Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml#cgov
(last
updated Feb. 13, 2014).
182. It is possible that without a federal intervention in corporate governance
"extralegal social forces" would pull back the board independence trend. See Langevoort,
supra note 58, at 817 (arguing against independence mandates).
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recommendations to their clients, including most institutional
investors, on how to vote their shares in the election of directors or
any other matter on which shareholders vote.'
RiskMetrics and its predecessor, Institutional Shareholder
Services ("ISS"), and Glass Lewis, the two largest proxy advisory
firms, have been quite aggressive in advocating particular governance
changes, including supermajority independent boards." Their
practice of recommending uniform standards for all firms has been
subject to much criticism.'
More troubling than the existence of voting recommendations
themselves was the fact that institutional investors were suspected of
relying on the recommendations without properly scrutinizing them.
Ira Millstein, a corporate governance guru, worried about the
influence of proxy advisors and the fact that "many major funds [but
not TIAA-CREF or CalPERS] rely on the anonymous advice of a
handful of proxy advisers rather than thinking for themselves."' 86
Voting decisions should be made by "knowledgeable money
managers," not corporate governance "experts."' Commentators
have worried that ISS exercised "tremendous clout"'88 and could
influence 20-30% of votes.18 9 The percentage is significant, even in
the universe where management proposals ordinarily prevail by wide
margins.
Professors Choi, Fisch, and Kahan have shown, however, that the
purported power of ISS has been overstated.' 90 They found that an
ISS recommendation could move 6-10% of the shareholder vote, a
relative drop in the bucket when almost 90% of directors are elected
with more than 90% of the vote.'9' Recommendations by other proxy

183. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT MALLOCH & SCOTT T. MASSEY, RENEWING
AMERICAN CULTURE: THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 170 (2006) (describing proxy
advisory firms and noting that they "give advice to institutional shareholders on how to
vote their stock").
184. See Bhagat et al., supra note 79, at 1874.
185. See id. at 1862.
186. SPENCER STUART, 2006 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2006), available at
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI-2006.pdf.
187. Id. at 15 (quoting Ira Millstein, Senior Partner at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP
and corporate governance scholar at Yale Law School).
188. Dennis K. Berman & Joann S. Lublin, Adviser ISS Puts Itself on Sale, Could Fetch
Up to $500 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at C4.
189. See Choi et al., supra note 132, at 871.
190. Id. at 869-70.
191. See id. at 888 (reporting that 89% of directors received 90% or more of the votes
cast).
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advisors had an even smaller effect.'" More recently, Professors
Randall Thomas, Adam Pritchard, and James Cotter studied the
influence of ISS in shareholder votes on executive compensation.193
They found that a negative recommendation by ISS was correlated
with a 20% decline in shareholder support. 194 But, once other factors
influencing the vote are taken into account, they found the ISS's
influence to be small, consistent with the Choi, Fisch, and Kahan

study. 19 5
But perceptions might drive the nominating committee's choices
more than facts. 196 Boards also read proxy advisory reports. They
might feel pressured to nominate an independent director when an
insider departs. Nominating committees might be looking for
independent directors to replace insiders out of a genuine concern
about possible negative repercussions.
Proxy advisors' influence may have peaked in the mid-2000s. In
March 2010, RiskMetrics rolled out a new corporate governance
rating methodology that evaluated companies along several
dimensions and provided absolute rather than relative scores. 197 The
new methodology strongly favored majority independent boards, but
gave less weight to supermajority independent boards.198 In January
2013, RiskMetrics released QuickScore, reviving relative ratings and
returning to its earlier position that more board independence is

192. See id. at 900.
193. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Adam C. Pritchard & James F. Cotter, DoddFrank's Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role of Shareholders in Corporate
Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (2012) (concluding that shareholders may have a
growing influence on executive pay as a result of Dodd-Frank's mandate which requires
shareholder vote for pay practices of top executives).
194. See id. at 1244.
195. See id. at 1247.
196. During ISS's heyday between 2004 and 2008, panicked executives lamented that
ISS alone could influence "a third or more" of the vote. See Paul Rose, The Corporate
GovernanceIndustry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889 (2007).
197. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, FAQ TRANSITION PLAN FOR CORPORATE ISSUERS,
RISKMETRICS'
GOVERNANCE
RISK INDICATORS 2
(2010), available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/FAQ-GRId-corporate.pdf.
198. See INST. S'HOLDER SERVS., GOVERNANCE RISK INDICATORS: A NEW
MEASURE
OF
GOVERNANCE-RELATED
RISK
30
(2010),
available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/GRIdTechDocFinal_20100915.pdf.

In

2012,

RiskMetrics updated that methodology, but without change in regard to board
composition. See Gary Hewitt, GOVERNANCE RISK INDICATORS 2.0, at 16 (2012),
available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/GRId2.0_TechnicalDocument20120306
.pdf.
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always better. 99 But, QuickScore continues to rate companies along
many dimensions, likely dampening the impact of changes. Although
proxy advisors continue to influence investor voting, their pressure to
increase board independence appears to have declined somewhat.
It is difficult to disaggregate the effects, but ultimately, it might
not matter. Companies' proxy statements from 2010 to 2013 reveal
that the trend towards boards with only one non-independent
director has continued, although the pressure from proxy advisors to
make that particular change has declined. While proxy advisors have
certainly influenced the move towards supermajority independent
boards, institutional investors have been the primary impetus behind
the trend. 20
3. Managerial Capture
Historically, managers captured the board of directors and the
election process. In the 1960s, the chief executive officer could have
" 'exactly the kind of a board he wants.' "201 While the CEO could
never appoint directors directly, he would select nominees, and the
director slate would be offered to shareholders for approval. As late
as 2001, 28% of companies had no nominating committee.202
Today, CEOs remain an important source of new director
nominees, but their influence has declined considerably over time. In
2012, CEOs selected the members of the nominating committee in
18% of firms.203 In 2010, CEOs were identified as the source of new
director recommendations in 12% of cases.2 " CEOs also interviewed
director candidates in 20% of firms, regardless of the source of the
recommendation.205
One plausible explanation for the trend towards supermajority
independent boards is that CEOs are appointing loyal independent
directors to the nominating committee or are continuing to control
the process by some other means. The increase in board
independence could be nominal, and the trend is one that managers
have co-opted. Alternatively, managers' first-order preference might
199. See INST. S'HOLDER SERvs., ISS GOVERNANCE QUICKSCORE: OVERVIEw 8, at
13 (2013), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISSGovernanceQuickScore
TechDoc.pdf.
200. See infra Part III.B.
201. Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 991 (quoting MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS:
MYTH AND REALITY 78 (1971)).
202. See id. at 1025 fig.2.
203. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 27.
204. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 13.
205. See 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 27.

2014]

BOARD INDEPENDENCE

889

be a board staffed with more insiders. But, nominating insiders could
instigate a proxy battle by activist shareholders. Even if the battle
were doomed, it would consume time and resources. As a second
order preference, managers, not investors, might be the ones who
prefer to sacrifice an inside director to add a nominally-independent
director.
There might be some truth to both theories, but there is also
evidence to the contrary. Top executives appear unhappy with the
shift towards a more director-controlled process.206 Serving on the
board of one's own company used to be training for junior executives
in line for the top job at that corporation. To make up, companies are
reaching out to other companies for outside board opportunities for
their up-and-coming executives. 207 They are outsourcing training,
losing the benefit of working closely with possible successors, as well
as potentially losing talented executives to other firms as they build
stronger external networks.20 8
In addition, the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, organizations that represent the interests of corporate
executives and small business owners, have successfully challenged
the SEC's rules that required increased board independence. 209 Their
persistence suggests that managers are generally uncomfortable with
the independence trend. Managerial capture is therefore not a
persuasive explanation for the trend of increasing board
independence.

206. See Murphy, supra note 8, at Bi (quoting Costco CFO and board member Richard
Galanti, explaining that his successor will probably not hold a board position because
boards need to look more "pro-shareholder").
207. See 2008 SSBI, supra note 138, at 5.
208. Some firms do not allow their executives to serve on other companies' boards
because they want them to remain focused on their work and limit the risk that the
executive will be recruited away. Perhaps the best known example is Apple, whose thenCEO Steve Jobs allowed only his successor, Tim Cook, to serve on a single outside board,
Nike. ADAM LASHINSKY, INSIDE APPLE: How AMERICA'S MOST ADMIRED-AND
SECRETIVE-COMPANY REALLY WORKS 98 (2012) (noting that Steve Jobs refused to
allow Apple executives to sit on outside boards because he wanted them to remain solely
focused on their work at Apple).
209. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating
the rule requiring mutual funds to have a board with no less than 75% of independent
directors and an independent chairman). In other situations, trade organizations have
advocated increased board independence. I believe that the best explanation is that the
Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are generally opposed to
increased board independence, but they prefer independence mandates to regulatory
prohibitions and restrictions of their substantive behavior.
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4. Director Influence
The responsibilities of directors have increased considerably
since the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, but so has their influence over
management.2 10 Corporate directors are keenly aware that public
companies are subject to public scrutiny.21' As a result, they may be
pushing separately for increased board independence.
Directors certainly have the ability to influence board
composition. Nominating committees that manage the board
nomination process have been overwhelmingly independent since at
least 2003.212 In addition, independent directors are increasingly the
source of new independent director nominees. In 2010, current
independent directors nominated 22% of new directors, while
executive search firms which nominating committees hired to locate
independent director candidates were the source of another 54% of
successful nominations.213
But institutional investor pressure is the likely reason for
directors' increased activity. Studies report that directors frequently
communicate with large investors about board composition,
nominations, and specific practices. 214 Big shifts in board governance
are often announced after intense discussions with important
shareholders, and rarely sua sponte.2 15
5. Sorting
The relative share of firms with only one nonindependent
director, the CEO, has been creeping up. The argument thus far has
assumed that the numerator, the aggregate number of firms with
supermajority independent boards, has increased. But the
denominator-the overall number of public firms-has also

210. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 1025-32 (showing how boards of
directors have become increasingly influential and independent from management since
the mid-1990s).
211. For example, in September 2013, following months of bad press resulting from a
series of missteps and enforcement actions, J.P. Morgan's board appointed a lead
independent director. The appointment was in response to meetings between independent
directors and activist shareholders. See Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, J.P. Morgan
Juices Up Director's Job, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://online.wsj.comlnews
/articles/SB1000142412788732386 4 604579064941840914528.
212. See 2003 SSBI, supra note 49, at 12.
213. See 2010 SSBI, supra note 1, at 13.
214. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Lublin, supra note 211 (reporting that shortly before J.P.
Morgan appointed a lead independent director, directors held several meetings with
institutional investors that demanded "a board shake-up").
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decreased.21 6 Perhaps companies with less independent boards have
gone private.2 17
There is little reason to believe that observed changes in board
composition are solely the result of exits, however. First, the share of
companies with supermajority independent boards has almost tripled
since 1997, from 23% to 60% in 2013.218 Over the same period, the
number of public firms in the United States declined by 38%.219 Even
if all exiting firms had boards with multiple insiders, their exits would
explain only 14%, a little more than one-third, of the 37% increase in
supermajority independent boards.220 Second, the data reported
include a relatively stable sample of leading companies, those in the
S&P 500 Index. 22 1 There is no reason to believe that companies that
were dropped from the Index were the ones with more insiders on
their boards, and were replaced by those with fewer.222
Thus, the trend towards supermajority independence does not
appear to be a result of insider-laden boards leaving public securities
markets. And, although proxy advisory firms remain influential and

216. See The Endangered Public Company, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21555562/. After the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and stock exchange reforms, many in the academy and the business circles feared that
firms have exited public securities markets to avoid the cost of compliance. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?,26 YALE J. ON REG. 229,
251-52 (2009) (citing empirical studies suggesting that the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act led many previously public firms to go private or delist to avoid the cost of
compliance).
217. See Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis & Tracy Yue Wang, Why Do Firms Go
Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations,45 J. ACCr.
& ECON. 181, 181 (2008) (finding that an abnormal number of firms ceased SEC reporting
after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
218. See supra Table 1.
219. See The Endangered Public Company, supra note 216.
220. The number could understate the effect of sorting. Some firms that delisted were
replaced with new firms that were more inclined to favor board independence.
221. The list of the companies in the index changes as a result of acquisitions and
spinoffs, and less often changes in market capitalization. See McGraw Hill Financial, S&P
U.S. Indices: Methodology 5-6 (2013), available at http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity
/sp-500 (showing that companies with $4.6 billion unadjusted market capitalization are
eligible for the S&P 500, while noting that companies are removed from the index when
involved in mergers, acquisitions, or significant restructuring such that they no longer meet
inclusion criteria). Note that board composition in smaller public firms appears to track
that of the S&P 500-there are no notable differences. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 47,
at 1024 tbl.5.
222. A recent study of public firms from 1999 to 2006 found that boards increased the
number of independent directors and reduced the number of insiders during that period.
The dataset includes only firms that were public throughout the period. See Steven
Schmeiser, Board Response to Majority Outsider Regulation, 24 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 19,
19, 21-22 (2014).
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management continues to influence director nominations, it appears
that the board independence trend is largely the product of
institutional investors' preferences.
III. WHY INVESTORS FAVOR SUPERMAJORITY INDEPENDENT

BOARDS
The compiled evidence suggests that public boards are becoming
increasingly independent because that is what investors want,
encouraged by proxy advisors and directors, and unopposed by
managers resigned to more vigilant shareholders. What remains
unanswered is why rational investors prefer boards with only one
insider to those with two or more in the absence of empirical support
that such boards improve corporate performance or reduce
wrongdoing.
This Part argues that board independence displaces substantive
reforms in the wake of corporate crises or scandals. The first Section
explains the regulatory dynamic. The following Section then offers
evidence from three crisis periods where investors and management
convinced Congress to adopt corporate governance solutions, in
particular independent boards, in lieu of substantive reform. The Part
concludes that independence is a poor substitute for regulation it
displaces, and proposes retirement of corporate governance
mandates.
A.

Corporate Governance as a Substitutefor Substantive Regulation
"[G]ross corporate wrongdoing or ... poor national economic

performance [that] is plausibly tied to corporate governance" usually
triggers federal regulation, particularly when the impact spreads
beyond shareholders to employees, entire industries, or the economy
as a whole.223 In the 1930s, during the Great Depression, Congress
regulated securities markets to reduce the likelihood of manipulation
and fraud.224 In the 1970s, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to curb corporate bribery of foreign government
officials.2" Accounting scandals led to the adoption of the Sarbanes223. See Roe, supra note 32, at 2529; Sale, supra note 87, at 147. See generally BANNER,
supra note 25 (tracing the cyclical nature of financial regulation through the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries).
224. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
225. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Oxley Act, and the financial crisis in 2008 gave us the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010.226
Additional federal regulatory requirements and invigorated
enforcement in the wake of crises and scandals can be very costly for
both the firms' managers and investors. The risk of a federal
intervention that would be costly for investors is greatest when
systemic governance failures appear to have caused the crisis. Those
very same governance failures often benefit diversified investors: they
receive the whole upside if things work out, but their downside
exposure is limited.227
As the crisis subsides and the most painful memories of scandal
fade, regulatory momentum wanes.228 A strategy that enables
managers and investors either to reduce the perceived need for
reform or to substitute for more onerous (but also more effective)
federal laws is thus valuable, perhaps immensely so. 229
To be successful, the strategy must appeal to Congress and
interest groups that favor reform-it must be credible as a solution
for negative externalities that corporate risk-taking and misconduct
generates. At the same time, the regulation-avoidance strategy must
also preserve the ability of corporate managers and investors to

226. This happened because neither regulators nor courts were willing to hold directors
accountable. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1849 (2007) ("After all, neither dominant interest-managers or
investors-will acquiesce in more public accountability without external pressure.").
227. See id. at 1836-37 (explaining that institutional investors favor reforms that
generate increases in share prices, but are uncomfortable with compliance reforms
designed to limit aggressive risk-taking); John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmets, Statistics
on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005, at 35 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working
Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103610 (finding that median
sanctions for cartels amounted to less than 21% of the overcharges); Bernadette A.
Minton, Jdr6me P.A. Taillard & Rohan Williamson, Do Independence and Financial
Expertise of the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance? 28-36 (Fisher Coll. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 2010-03-014, 2011), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661855
(finding a negative relationship between director independence and financial expertise
and corporate performance during the most recent financial crisis, and concluding that the
evidence is consistent with directors with financial expertise recognizing the residual
nature of shareholders' claim on a bank's highly leveraged balance sheet that is
guaranteed by the government); Karpoff et al., supra note 27, at 4-5 (explaining that a
firm's probability of getting caught for paying bribes is a mere 6.4%, but those that are
caught face sanctions lower than the benefit from bribe-payment).
228. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Waning in Congress
for Tougher Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al (explaining that by
June 2002, the regulatory momentum to regulate in the aftermath of Enron had waned).
229. See id. (arguing that "Enron's moment as a galvanizing issue has quickly passed"
and that "[albsent a spate of further disclosures ... the issues may remain too remote to
change many voters' minds").
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continue sharing the rents generated by the firm to the exclusion of
others.
The remainder of this Article argues that the supermajority
independent board satisfies all of these requirements. Despite the
popularity of independent directors in corporate institutional design,
they are, in fact, a poor substitute for public-regarding regulation of
negative externalities.230 They can, however, pass as a substitute.2 31 To
be sure, supermajority independent boards are not costless to
investors-they may be negatively correlated with corporate
performance-but that cost is small in comparison with the far
greater cost that more restrictive federal laws would entail.
1. Competing Interests in Corporate Governance
American corporate law authorizes managers and shareholders
to make decisions in the interest of the corporations they represent.
Shareholders cannot manage firms directly, so they elect directors,
who, in turn, select managers to run the day-to-day business
operations while directors monitor them. The separation of
ownership and control engenders agency costs, but incentive
compensation and boards responsive to shareholder concerns reduce
these costs. 232 Although the agency problem remains a core feature of
corporate law and theory, most of the time the interests of managers
and investors are aligned to a considerable extent.233 When times are
good, the two interest groups can decide to govern firms in a way that
maximizes each group's benefit: high stock prices for investors and
high compensation for executives.234
But shareholder wealth and social welfare are not synonymous.
High stock prices can reflect higher expected revenues from bringing
innovative new products to market and improving efficiencies in
production and distribution, but they can also result from rent-

230. See infra Part III.A.2.
231. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 654 ("To accept the independent director as a
[substitute to] government regulation ... will-in many areas certainly, and in most
probably-result in less protection for consumers, suppliers, workers, and the general
public."); Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent CorporateBoard: A Means to What End?,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 553 (1984) (summarizing critical views that "the independent
board as a surrogate for the legislature in determining public policy is likely to do a poor
job, both economically and politically").
232. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 47, at 989 (observing that since 2000,
CEO power has weakened and their responsiveness to shareholder interests increased).
233. See Roe, supra note 32, at 2515-16.
234. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-CentricReality, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1907, 1917 (2013).
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seeking value transfers from nonshareholders. In addition, stock
prices do not incorporate negative externalities, unless the firm is
forced to internalize them. Even if they do not want managers to
break the law, shareholders benefit from activities that reduce overall
social welfare, including price fixing, bribery, polluting the
environment, and externalizing risk. Those harmed--competitors,
workers, consumers, environmentalists, financial creditors, and
public-interest-minded politicians-thus have an economic interest in
how corporations behave and a related political interest in restricting
corporate freedom.
a.

Investors

Investors want high risk-adjusted returns as measured by stock
prices.2 35 Efforts to reduce agency costs and maximize returns to
shareholders increase the social surplus,236 but only if the expectations
of others who provide inputs to the firm (creditors, employees,
suppliers, consumers) and those affected by firm activities (the
environment, local governments, taxpayers) are fully protected by
contracts or regulation. If contracts are incomplete and regulation is
missing, limited, or circumvented, as is often the case, shareholders
can benefit not only by increasing overall firm productivity, but also

235. Several books and articles argue that the interests of long-term shareholders and
short-term shareholders diverge. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS,
AND THE PUBLIC 74 (2012); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
BUS. LAW. 101, 104 (1979); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-In the Boardroom
and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. LAW. 977, 986-87 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One
FundamentalCorporateGovernance Question We Face: Can CorporationsBe Managedfor
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66
BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (2010). But Usha Rodrigues makes a good case that long-term investors
do not exist. Instead, even investors saving for retirement or college are "more properly
seen as short-term investors with long-term interests." Usha Rodrigues, Corporate
Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1822, 1826 (2011).
236. See Fisch, supra note 31, at 658 (analyzing the theory that maximizing firm value
equally maximizes shareholder value, thereby giving residual claimants an incentive to
maximize firm value); Gordon, supra note 5, at 1535 (observing that the claim "that
shareholder wealth maximization ... in fact maximize[s] social surplus" is normatively
attractive). Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter argued that the notion leads to predictable
problems: stock prices send reliable governance signals only in a small subset of cases
where the issue is clear-cut and information asymmetries are minimal. See William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 653, 689 (2010).
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by transferring value from nonshareholders to themselves, producing
social welfare losses in the process.237 Stock prices rise in either case.
The easiest way to transfer value from nonshareholders to
shareholders is by increasing the level of risk." Shareholders can
benefit by gambling with value that would otherwise be paid to
employees, creditors, or the government. For example, banks and
insurance companies are required to keep reserves to cover loan
defaults and expected future claims.239 When profits are otherwise
lagging, banks have been known to release reserves to boost
profitability, while simultaneously depleting the cushion for economic
downturns.2 40 Insurance companies successfully lobbied to reduce
statutory reserves and plan to use "billions of dollars for acquisitions,
stock buybacks, dividend increases," and otherwise to boost investors'
returns. 241 Lower reserves increase the risk of failure, debt default,
layoffs, and taxpayer bailouts.2 42
In addition, current shareholders generally have an economic
incentive to underinvest in monitoring to the extent that they reap the
full benefit of corporate wrongdoing, but externalize part (or all) of
the cost to nonshareholders. 243 For example, shareholders (as

237. See Fisch, supra note 31, at 659; see also Nalin Kulatilaka & Stephen Gary Marks,
The Strategic Value of Flexibility: Reducing the Ability to Compromise, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 574, 574 (1988) (explaining that "incomplete contracting is the norm [in] the labor
market"). "A transfer of value from one party to another is not a social cost per se. But, a
zero-cost transfer assumes perfect competition, information, substitution, and rationality,
as well as zero transaction costs. When these assumptions are relaxed, as they must be, all
transfers will produce social deadweight losses." Velikonja, supra note 29, at 1902 n.60.
238. See Fisch, supra note 31, at 659-60.
239. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1404, 4310 (McKinney 2013); 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1, 204.4(f)
(2013).

240. See Michael Rapoport, Banks Depleting Earnings Backstop, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,
2012, at C1.

241. Leslie Scism, Insurers Add Reserve Power, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2012, at C1.
242. Several studies have found that financial firms with the most shareholder-friendly
governance and higher incentive-based executive pay were more likely to get into trouble
and be bailed out during the financial crisis. See, e.g., Ruidiger Fahlenbrach & Rend M.
Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 11 (2011) (finding
some banks whose CEOs' incentives were better aligned with the interests of their
shareholders actually performed worse both in terms of stock returns and in terms of
accounting return on equity); Reint Gropp & Matthias Kohler, Bank Owners or Bank
Managers: Who Is Keen on Risk? Evidence from the Financial Crisis 1 (Eur. Bus. Sch.
Research Paper No. 10-02, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555663 (finding
that shareholder-controlled banks had higher profits in the years before the crisis, and
incurred larger losses and were more likely to require government assistance during the
crisis).
243. See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting
Corporate Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 960
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shareholders) ordinarily benefit from cartels, which transfer value
from consumers, 244 or from paying bribes for prime government
contracts, which transfer value from other businesses that are not
willing or able to compete with bribes. Absent public ordering,
private liability, or reputational sanctions, firms underinvest in
preventing activities that benefit shareholders at the expense of
nonshareholders.2 45 Absent a clear legal mandate in regard to the
quality of oversight and conflict-free oversight, corporations
maximizing shareholder wealth underspend on compliance.246
b.

Managers

All else being equal, managers prefer broad autonomy to
manage corporate affairs. 247 They prefer the quiet life and stability
over aggressive risk-taking. 24 8 This preference is shifted, however,
when compensation is tied to measures of performance, such as
bonuses tied to revenues or profits, or when managers receive equitybased compensation, like stock options or restricted stock grants.249
Managers are willing to trade autonomy for money and
maximize the stock price when they are rewarded for doing so. 250
Some efforts to boost the stock price are socially valuable, such as
product innovation or new ways of generating revenues from existing
product lines. Others are not, whether they are illegal (e.g., earnings
(2006) (observing that existing investors suffer rather than benefit from discovery of
wrongdoing and prefer "less-than-full transparency ex post").
244. See Connor & Helmers, supra note 227, at 35 (finding that median sanctions for
cartels amounted to less than 21% of the overcharges). Since individual shareholders are
also consumers, price fixing imposes a cost as well as a benefit. The net balance depends
on how much of the relevant product or service they purchase, directly or indirectly, and
on how much equity in the price-fixing company they own. On net, shareholder-consumers
benefit from cartels the more equity they own and the less of the affected product or
service they consume.
245. The argument does not rely on shareholders affirmatively desiring managers to
break the law. Rather, investors have an interest to underinvest in compliance designed to
prevent illegality that benefits the firm. While they might prefer that managers do not pay
bribes or fix prices, shareholders as a class have a powerful incentive to spend only as
much on compliance as is in their private interest, not as is socially optimal. Since
enforcement of bribes and cartels is meek and sanctions moderate compared to the benefit
derived from illegality, the incentive to underspend is all the greater.
246. For a more complete discussion, see Velikonja, supra note 29, at 1915-29.
247. See Roe, supra note 32, at 2504-06.
248. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?
CorporateGovernance and ManagerialPreferences,111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1043 (2003).
249. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 236, at 710-11; Rock, supra note 234, at 1935.
250. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1533-34 (observing that during the 1990s,
compensation contracts shifted managers' preferences towards shareholder value at the
expense of managerial autonomy).
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manipulation) or not (e.g., increasing leverage in banking). To a large
extent, equity compensation aligns the interests of managers with
those of investors, and neither investors nor managers want to share
decision-making in corporate governance with others: they "usually
do not want corporate law to go federal."2 s"
c. Everybody Else
Corporate activities in public firms also affect the well-being of
noninvestors. Employees and labor unions want higher wages and job
security, financial institutions as creditors want greater stability,
consumers want low prices, environmentalists want improved air and
water quality, productivity-promoting policymakers want to foster
"competition and strong capital markets," and public interest groups
want to limit corporate power to advance social responsibility.2 52
Although the specific goals of outsiders diverge, they are generally in
favor of federal regulation that would limit the ability of firms to
engage in anticompetitive practices, bribery, and rent-seeking, thus
reducing the harm to their physical and social environments.253
The interests of investors and the public diverge, and financial
crises tend to expose that disparity. Financial regulation in the
aftermath of crisis is virtually inevitable, but the shape it takes is not
predetermined. "Good" corporate governance, whether voluntarily
implemented or mandated by law, can satisfy the public demand for
regulation while otherwise maintaining the pre-crisis status quo.
Independence mandates have been a particularly useful tool for
deflecting regulation that would be more costly for investors but
arguably more effective at forcing firms to internalize costs. 25 4

251. Roe, supra note 32, at 2518.
252. See Roe, supra note 32, at 2496. Public policymakers include the Federal Reserve,
the Council of Economic Advisors, Congress's General Accounting Office, and the SEC.
Competition and strong capital markets should not be confused with corporate
profitability. Neither managers nor shareholders want product-market competition, for
example, and textbook-perfect competition would eliminate all economic profits.
253. See Roe, supra note 32, at 2495 ("Those outsiders often have a regulatory
agenda.").
254. During the early days of the independence trend, SEC Chairmen repeatedly
stressed that the independent director was "the savior of corporate legitimacy and an
appropriate substitute for regulation." Brudney, supra note 24, at 621 & n.62. Increasing
the racial and gender diversity on corporate boards is another example of firms using
board composition to score political points. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom
Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity
on CorporateBoards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795 (2005) (explaining that boards have become
more diverse despite the absence of empirical support that diversity improves corporate
performance).
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2. Strategic Potential of Independence
A tactic (or an asset) has strategic potential if it enables the one
who uses it to benefit more from it than others anticipated, either
because of better information or the ability to control and direct the
outcome.255 Strategic value is a term used to describe competitive
behavior, R&D expansion, and even military tactics, but it is also
useful to consider the strategic use of corporate governance
improvements in the aftermath of corporate scandal or crisis in
national politics.
Corporations use a variety of tools to avert a regulatory response
to crisis. Lobbying is one much-used tool. In the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis, banks took a keen interest in agency rulemaking
designed to restrict profitable but risky practices.2 56 Public relations
campaigns designed to frame failures as outliers are another tool. In
the aftermath of accounting fraud scandals in 2002, then-President
George W. Bush blamed "a few bad apples," emphasizing individual
wrongdoing over systemic problems. As part of their outreach in
the wake of scandal or crisis, manager and investor groups often
voluntarily initiate reforms through self-regulatory organizations
("SROs")-the exchanges, National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA")-to
convince
Congress
that
intervention
is
25
8
unnecessary. Where voluntary efforts are too weak to preempt
federal legislation, institutional investors-either individually or,
more often, through SROs-put pressure on Congress to adopt
corporate governance reforms in lieu of substantive requirements.
Congress can intervene in a variety of ways. The most intrusive is
substantive regulation of corporate activities. It is also the method
that limits rent-seeking opportunities of investors and managers the

255. See Jay B. Barney, Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business
Strategy, 32 MGMT. SC. 1231, 1234 (1986) (observing that in any market, a firm can avoid
losses or exploit profit opportunities if it has better information or more accurate
"expectations about the future value of the strateg[ies]").
256. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making
of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 59 (2013) (observing that investment banks
"actively lobbied agencies to adopt favorable definitions, interpretations, and exemptions"
to the Volcker Rule before the notice of the proposed rule was published and comments
were sought).
257. See Madelaine Drohan, Knowing When to Stop Reporting About Scandal, 59
NIEMAN REP. 117, 118 (2005), available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports
/article/100610/Knowing-When-to-Stop-Reporting-About-a-Scandal.aspx/.
258. See Ribstein, supra note 78, at 57-61.
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most. 25 9 For example, Congress could require public companies to
incorporate federally or eliminate limited liability for federally
insured financial institutions. 2 6 It could ban risky derivatives or
mandate federal licensing for complex financial instruments. 26 1 It
could prescribe rules for preparing and reviewing financial statements
and empower (and fund) an IRS-like federal agency to audit financial
reporting.262 Congress has, in fact, taken control over anticompetitive
behavior 263 and public tender offers, 26 restricted the ability of
corporations to purchase non-audit services from their auditors,265
provided for clawback of bonuses and other incentives in the event of
a material restatement,2 66 and considerably limited the highly
profitable ability of financial institutions to trade financial
instruments on their own account, rather than on their customers'
accounts.267
Considerably less costly for investors are disclosure requirements
and formal corporate governance mandates, such as statutory
requirements that corporations maintain a fully independent audit
committee268 or regulatory instructions to exchanges to mandate
259. There are few effective substitutes for government regulation of negative
externalities and public goods, and not for the lack of trying. Behavioral law and
economics has tried to develop a third way for regulating the economy and has produced
unsatisfactory solutions-solutions that fall short of government mandates. See Ryan
Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
260. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 409
(2012) (proposing "elective shareholder liability" whereby shareholders would cover the
cost of a bank's failure).
261. See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex
FinancialProducts, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 63,66 (2012).
262. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in
CorporateLaw: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley,53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 755 (2005).
263. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588, 607-08 (2003)
(describing the late nineteenth century trust movement and the impetus for federal
involvement).
264. In 1968, Congress adopted the Williams Act, and the federal government
remained a major player in mergers and acquisitions until 1987. See Mark J. Roe,
Delawareand Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2009).
265. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771-72
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2012)).
266. See id. § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012)); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2012)).
267. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 619. See generally Prohibitions and Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and
Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (proposed Feb. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
75) (implementing the so-called "Volcker Rule").
268. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012)).
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majority independent boards of directors and independent
committees. 26 9 Disclosure is believed to least disrupt the balance of
power between managers and investors, and the rest of us.270 Section
972 of the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, authorizes the SEC to
require firms to explain why the CEO also serves as chairman of the
board. 271 The purpose of disclosure is to inform shareholders and
thereby improve their ability to control managers. Generally,
disclosure does little to constrain the ability of corporate managers to
transfer value from nonshareholders to shareholders.2 72
Similarly, rational investors should favor corporate governance
solutions to substantive prohibitions because independent boards and
the managers they supervise are expected to maximize shareholder
wealth, not social welfare.273 Independent boards can be coopted for
shareholder purposes far more easily than an independent agency
implementing new financial legislation.274
Where congressional intervention is inevitable, as it was when
WorldCom's fraud was exposed nine months after Enron,275 the
ability to convince Congress to choose regulation that preserves
investors' and managers' freedom is valuable. At that juncture,
investors have a financial interest in promoting corporate governance

269. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012)).
270. See Romano, supra note 78, at 1527-28 (arguing that corporate governance
mandates are "a different and more costly regulatory approach" compared with
disclosure).
271. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 972
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2012)).
272. See Rodrigues, supra note 235, at 1850. But see Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraudas Corporate Governance:Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L.
REV. 859, 872-74 (2003) (describing how disclosure requirements can sometimes force
substantive changes).
273. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 652; see also Robert B. Reich, Corporate
Accountability and Regulatory Reform, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 30-31 (1979) (arguing that
corporate governance reform is "justified by virtue of what it accomplishes for the
corporation in the long run: Avoiding additional governmental regulation and achieving
long-term profitability").
274. Financial institutions have mounted a mighty and expensive lobbying campaign to
water down the Volcker Rule. Despite the industry's best efforts, the final rule appears to
be more detailed, lengthier, and more stringent than industry expected. See Matthew
Goldstein & Ben Protess, Near Vote, Volcker Rule Weathering New Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9,2013, at Bl.
275. See Romano, supra note 78, at 1557-58 & n.97 ("Senator Jon Corzine, a member
of the Banking Committee, was described as having 'said the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] would
have lost momentum without WorldCom and the other scandals that followed Enron.' "
(quoting Spencer S. Hsu & Kathleen Day, Senate Vote Spotlights Audit Reform and
Sarbanes,WASH. POST, July 15, 2002, at Al)).
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mandates over substantive prohibitions because they are better able
to contain the cost of implementation and control the outcome. 27 6
This is so because corporate law and capital markets make it difficult
for independent directors to further the public interest over the
interests of investors, whose wealth they are expected to maximize.
Shareholders elect directors, and only shareholders can sue the board
of directors for breaches of fiduciary duties. 277 Nonshareholders such
as employees cannot sue the board of directors for breaches of
fiduciary duties-only shareholders can. 278 The SEC and federal
prosecutors, likewise, have been reluctant to pursue independent
directors for monitoring failures. 279
Moreover, directors are increasingly paid in stock and stock
options to "align[] directors' interests with those of stockholders." 280
In 2012, 58% of director compensation was in equity and the rest in
cash, usually as retainers. 28 1 The trend developed in the 1990S282 and
276. While many corporate law scholars rallied against the independence requirements
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, business interests were considerably more troubled
by the requirements of CEO and auditor certification. See Bainbridge,supra note 74, at
1781; Langevoort, supra note 243, at 950.
277. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011) ("[A]n annual meeting of
stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated
by or in the manner provided in the bylaws."); § 327 ("In any derivative suit instituted by a
stockholder of a corporation, it shall be averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a
stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder
complains or that such stockholder's stock thereafter devolved upon such stockholder by
operation of law.").
278. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 31, at 653 (explaining that Delaware courts have
rejected fiduciary duty claims by non-shareholders). And even shareholder lawsuits for
fiduciary duty breaches against independent directors rarely succeed. See Bernard Black,
Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1063-64 (2006) (finding that between 1980 and 2005, outside directors contributed out-ofpocket to settlements for fiduciary breaches in only thirteen cases).
279. See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECrION 704 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACr
OF 2002, at 2-3 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf
(showing that the SEC named 705 individuals in enforcement actions for securities fraud it
initiated between 1997 and 2002, and none were reported as independent directors). For
proposed solutions to this problem, see also Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and
Deterrenceof Accounting Fraud,44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1324-26 (2011) (proposing
that the SEC could use leverage against independent directors to get access to information
about wrongdoing).
280. 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 36; see Charles M. Elson, Director Compensationand
the Management-CapturedBoard-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L.
REV. 127, 130-31 (1996) (proposing that companies compensate outside directors
primarily in restricted stock to induce them "to think more like shareholders").
281. 2012 SSBI, supra note 11, at 36.
282. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1487 & n.79 (citing Eliezer M. Fich & Anil
Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm
Value, 78 J. BUS. 2229, 2229 (2005) (observing that the share of Fortune 1000 firms that
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has served as a strong signal to directors for what matters: high share
prices, not stability, quality products, or long-term growth.283
When used as a substitute for government regulation,
independent boards lead to "less protection for consumers, suppliers,
workers, and the general public."2" For investors, however, the costbenefit of independent boards compared with alternatives that they
displaced is decidedly positive.
3. Popular Appeal of Independence
Independent boards of directors are the most common policy
response to corporate governance crises. 285 Several reasons combine
to make independent directors a popular compromise solution for
failures of corporate governance: the normative appeal of
independence, the vagueness of purpose and flexibility of
independence, the ubiquity of independent institutions in institutional
design, and the low cost of implementation.
First, independence has become a synonym for something
"noble," "expert," "objective," and "fair."286 Independent directors
are believed to "tolerate less fraud and illegality,"287 and to "promote
the firm's compliance with legal norms," despite limited evidence that
this is in fact true. 28 8 The normative appeal of the notion of
independence makes it difficult to oppose. 289
Second, independence is an underspecified concept. 29 0 It means
"different things to different people." 29 1 In the context of corporate
boards, it is defined as a "lack of ties to the corporation" 2 9 or a lack
compensated directors with equity increased from approximately 20% to 50% between
1992 and 1997)).
283. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and
Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2363-65 (2010) (showing that certain equity
compensation schemes such as opportunistic timing create perverse incentives for
directors to accept practices that inflate stock prices).
284. Brudney, supra note 24, at 654.
285. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate
Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939, 943 (2010).
286. See Peter Conti-Brown & Ronald J. Gilson, The Limits of Independence in
Institutional Design 6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
287. Langevoort, supra note 226, at 1831.
288. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1509.
289. See Fairfax,supra note 58, at 131.
290. See Conti-Brown & Gilson, supra note 286, at 1.
291. WILLIAM BERNHARD, BANKING ON REFORM: POLITICAL PARTIES AND
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 19 (2002)
(discussing the popularity and the use of independence in central banking).
292. Rodrigues, supra note 23, at 453 & n.20.
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of ties to management.293 Independent directors are conceptualized as
individuals without interests who can provide a "fresh, unbiased,
expert perspective to the task of corporate management." 29 4 They are
superior to all other dependent groups with clear interests: managers,
shareholders, employees, public interest groups, and creditors. While
special interests are suspect, independent directors are not.
Third, the vagueness of the concept of independence, combined
with capacious judicial deference standards and a low risk of liability
for independent directors, makes the independent board a very
flexible institution. The roles that independent directors play in the
corporation's governance have dramatically expanded over the last
forty years.295 Independent directors are a plausible fix for any and all
problems, and they can credibly be sold as such. Independent
directors are viewed differently by various constituencies: investors
view them as advocates for shareholder wealth maximization;
employees view them as advocates for institutional stability; financial
creditors view them as a voice of reason against excessive risk-taking;
environmentalists view them as stewards of our environment; and still
other interests view them as representatives of the public interest.2 96
Their appointment placates all interested constituencies, from
shareholders to populists, and satisfies the demand for regulation.
In addition, independent representatives, in one form or another,
are used in a stunning variety of legal institutions including central

banks,297 administrative agencies, 29 8 federal 299 and state
accountants,"' expert witnesses,

2

judges,3

banking analysts," journalists,3 "

293. See Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform:
Independence or Democracy?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1, 18-19.
294. Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1060.
295. See Gordon,supra note 5, at 1490-96; Conti-Brown & Gilson, supra note 286, at 2.
296. See Langevoort, supra note 226, at 1820 (discussing the public interest values of
independent directors).
297. See Conti-Brown & Gilson, supra note 286, at 12-13 (discussing the different
aspects of central bank independence).
298. See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds.,
2010) (explaining that independence in the context of administrative agencies means that
the President cannot remove heads of agencies without cause).
299. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing the independence of the judiciary by
providing that federal judges hold their offices "during good Behaviour," and prohibiting
pay reductions while in office).
300. States differ in the mechanisms used to insulate their judges from the political
process. See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on
Courts:Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 399,402 (2006).
301. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201-09, 116 Stat. 745,
771-75 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.) (providing for
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government employees,305 redistricting comniissions,3'" and trustees in
corporate bankruptcies.3 07 The ubiquity of independence as well as its
relative success make it more likely to be well-received as a matter of
institutional design in all contexts3 08-the fourth explanation for the
popularity of the independent board.
Finally, independent directors are perceived as inexpensive.309
They are inexpensive from Congress's point of view because no new
appropriations are needed. They are inexpensive from investors'
point of view, who benefit from independent directors' willingness to
pursue shareholder interests over those of other stakeholders. They
are inexpensive from the point of view of managers, who continue to
play a part in director selection and who sit on the board with
independent directors, shaping their views about the firm and how it
should be governed. While independent directors generally constrain

mechanisms to preserve independence of accountants of public companies under the title
"Auditor Independence"); see also Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case
of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT.
REv. 1, 3 (2006) (describing that independent auditors should be unbiased).
302. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism,12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 465, 467-68 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of "independence and
objectivity" of expert witnesses).
303. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 39,43 (2007) (giving a broad overview of the effects of analyst independence).
304. See Scorr GANT, WE'RE ALL JOURNALISTS Now: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 118 (2007) (describing
state "shield" laws that allow journalists to refuse to uncover their sources).
305. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Paradoxes of Government Ethics, 52 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 254, 255 (1992) (describing government employees' ethics requirements, designed for
"creating and maintaining confidence in government").
306. See Scott M. Lesowitz, Independent Redistricting Commissions, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 535, 540-42 (2006) (assessing the pros and cons of independent redistricting
commissions).
307. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A), (C) (2012) (defining "disinterested person"); id.
§ 327(a), (c) (providing that persons managing the debtor's affairs in bankruptcy be
disinterested and without any material interest adverse to those of the debtor, equity
holders, or creditors).
308. For example, in Dodd-Frank alone, the terms independent and independence
appear 120 times, in contexts as varied as the independence of credit rating agencies, the
independence of members of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the designation
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as an independent agency, the
independence of home value appraisals, and the independence of Inspectors General. See,
e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§§ 939C, 975(b)(1)(B), 1100D(a), 1472, 1505, 124 Stat. 1376, 1888, 1916, 2111, 2187, 2222
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
309. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 659 (concluding that independent directors are
perceived to cost less than regulation but are an inefficient "substitute for regulation in the
interest of investors or society").
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managers more than insiders, that is a small price to pay to avoid
more onerous federal regulation.'
These factors combine to make the independent board a viable
compromise remedy for problems associated with corporate
governance: illegal payments, fraudulent financial statements and
complicit audits, excessive corporate risk-taking, and runaway
executive compensation. Independent directors have been asked to
oversee compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and catch
wrongdoing, to evaluate an auditor's conflicts of interest and
supervise its work, to set the standards of social responsibility of the
company, and monitor performance and compliance with those
standards."'
But while the cost is low, the benefit of supermajority
independent boards is trivial at best. The capacity and willingness of
independent boards to prevent management from engaging in
inefficient rent-seeking behavior that increases stock prices but
reduces welfare (e.g., cartels, bribery and corruption, earnings
manipulation, and excessive leverage) is relatively small.312 Unlike
independent agencies that arguably have no master and serve the
public interest, corporate boards owe fiduciary duties only to
shareholders. When the interests of shareholders diverge from those
of the economy as a whole, even the best independent boards will

310. Manager groups have taken an ambivalent position on independent boards. They
joined the independence bandwagon after Enron, but opposed SEC's rule requiring
mutual funds to maintain 75% independent boards and authorizing proxy access. See
Gordon, supra note 5, at 1539; see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144,1156 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (vacating the rule authorizing proxy access); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating the rule requiring mutual funds to have a
board with no less than 75% of independent directors and an independent chairman). The
ambivalence is consistent with the hypothesis that I advance: independence is useful
politically, but costly economically (assuming no regulatory threat).
311. See Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain
The Future of Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosenblum & Katz (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew
/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.18080.10.pdf.
312. See, e.g., Sonali Hazarika, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Rajarishi Nahata, Internal
Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover and Earnings Management, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 44,
44 (2012) (finding that boards are more likely to replace managers who aggressively
manipulate earnings before manipulations lead to costly external consequences, but the
effect is relatively modest); Minton et al., supra note 227, at 6 (finding a negative
relationship between director independence and financial expertise and corporate
performance during the most recent financial crisis, and concluding that the evidence is
consistent with "directors recognizing the residual nature of shareholders' claim on a
bank's highly leveraged balance sheet").
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usually produce outcomes that are consistent with investors'
preferences but reduce welfare.313
Increases in board independence, whether voluntary or legally
imposed, are a rational and, in fact, highly successful political strategy
for investors to avert federal regulation that is more costly for
investors but potentially more effective at resolving negative
externalities of corporate behavior and misbehavior.3 14
4. Overcoming the Collective Action Problem
The narrative explaining the move towards supermajority
independent boards assumes that institutional investors pushing for
such boards are willing to incur an immediate cost in exchange for a
future regulatory benefit. This presents a collective action problem:
good firms-the ones that adopt supermajority independent boardsare generating a positive externality for the bad firms.
The collective action problem is easily overstated. First, the cost
of supermajority independent boards to firms appears to be relatively
small, while the benefit is not. Second, the collective action problem is
largely overcome because of the involvement of SROs and investors'
trade organizations in the development of corporate governance best
practices. The NYSE, NASDAQ, the Council of Institutional
Investors, National Association of Corporate Directors, and even the
Business Roundtable have endorsed supermajority independent
boards.
B.

Evidence in the Wake of Crisis
Congress became involved in corporate law after every scandal
in recent decades and threatened to change its landscape

313. Investors' appetite for risk is considerably higher than that of the economy. Their
downside is limited through diversification and bailouts, and often, they recover their
losses relatively quickly after scandal. They reap the benefits during bull times, but do not
bear the full cost of bear times. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 252 (2010) (explaining that shareholders'
benefit from risk externalities); Rock, supra note 234, at 1911 (suggesting that managers
nowadays have high-powered incentives to maximize shareholder value, even when it
reduces firm value and social welfare); Alla Golub, Joshua Detre & John M. Connor, The
Profitability of Price-Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions Deterred? 11 (Apr. 8,
2005), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1188515 (finding the
share prices of 87% of the firms in a sample involving indictments between 1981 and 2001
had regained 100% of their pre-indictment levels within one year).
314. See Brudney, supra note 24, at 652-53 (observing that proponents of independent
boards conceded that "the institutional change is urged to avoid political pressure for
imposition of substantive regulation" of externalities and public goods).
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considerably. At every turn, increasing the independence of the board
of directors has worked to deflect other regulation."'s
1. The "Questionable Payments" Scandal and Internal Accounting
Controls
In 1972, a handful of large corporations funded the break-in of
the Democratic headquarters.3 6 The investigations that followed the
Watergate scandal revealed a widespread practice of bribery,
corruption, and shady accounting practices." Ultimately, more than
fifty firms were indicted or faced an SEC enforcement action, and
hundreds voluntarily revealed that they made illegal campaign
contributions, paid bribes, and falsified their accounting statements.318
During the early days of the scandal, the SEC Chairman
suggested that the NYSE "take the lead in this area by appropriately
revising its listing policies." 319 As more misbehavior was revealed, the
pressure on Congress to intervene increased. Congress considered a
variety of regulatory options, including federal incorporation.3 20
Recognizing the threat, the American Bar Association and the
Business Roundtable, an organization of corporate executives,
advocated the use of internal compliance programs and independent

315. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 231, at 546 (illustrating an early example from the
mid-1970s, when the business community and corporate lawyers "began considering
voluntary measures that might ward off federal legislation," notably federal chartering of
corporations). All three statutes considered in this Part included important substantive
requirements and prohibitions, in addition to corporate governance mandates. The
argument is that independent boards deflected some substantive regulation. Hard
evidence is difficult to assemble because of missing data on the various proposals that may
have been considered behind closed doors because of the impossibility to observe fluid
coalitions in real time, and because the costs and benefits of regulatory alternatives under
consideration are essentially unknowable. The evidence offered, however, is consistent
with the hypothesis offered in this Article that the rise of independent boards is politically
motivated.
316. See Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute
Principlesof Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 333-34 (1987)
(exploring the nature of the illegal contributions); Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI
Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1972, at Al (reporting
that campaign contributions for President Nixon's reelection were used to fund a political
spying and sabotage campaign against Democratic presidential contenders).
317. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1516.
318. See id.; Seligman, supra note 316, at 334-36.
319. SEC, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT NO. 353, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 45 (1976).

320. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
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directors' oversight over those programs to "ward off federal

legislation."3 21
Congress ultimately adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
in 1977 ("FCPA").322 The FCPA response was moderate: it required
corporations to maintain accurate books and to self-police by
implementing a system of internal accounting controls.3 23 The NYSE
followed in 1978 and required listed companies to maintain a fully
independent audit committee to implement and oversee internal
control systems.324 Independent directors were installed as a control
mechanism for corporate misbehavior, without evidence that
independent directors are, in fact, able to prevent and detect
wrongdoing better than alternatives,325 and without articulating
clearly "for whose benefit [internal controls] exist, and to what
end. "326
Using the corporate board of directors to police corruption and
bribery is curious because bribe-paying harms a firm's competitors,
not investors.3 27 The revelation of bribes tends to reduce the stock
price of the disclosing firm in the immediate aftermath,3 28 but bribe-

321. Karmel, supra note 231, at 546 ("In reaction to the SEC's corporate governance
hearings [in 1976 following the foreign bribery scandals] and to threats of corporate
chartering legislation, the business community and corporate lawyers began considering
voluntary measures that might ward off federal legislation."); see also ABA Comm. on
Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1605, 1619-25
(1978) (overviewing some ways to provide appropriate director oversight); Statement of
the Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation,33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2101-02, 2108 (1978) (emphasizing the
need for policies and procedures implementing corporate law compliance programs).
322. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3. 78ff (2012)).
323. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
324. See Statement of the Bus. Roundtable, supra note 321, at 2109-10.
325. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1337 (2002) (arguing that it is impossible for outside directors to oversee the
audit); Brudney, supra note 24, at 616.
326. Langevoort, supra note 243, at 950.
327. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 221 (2010) (explaining that by paying a bribe, the high-cost
supplier gets the government contract, rather than its lower-cost competitor); David
Barstow & Alejandra Xanic von Bertrab, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs
To Get Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at Al (reporting that wherever WalMart de Mexico moved by bribing government officials, it tended to displace "small
neighborhood shops and a traditional public market in the central square").
328. See Aaron Smith, Wal-Mart Shares Drop After Mexico Report, CNNMONEY (Apr.
23, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/23/markets/walmartstock/index.htm (reporting
that Wal-Mart's stock price declined 4.7% after bribery allegations surfaced).
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paying is enormously profitable for investors and management.32 9 For
example, Wal-Mart de Mexico grew at a breakneck pace and built in
locations out of reach to other companies because it was willing to
grease the wheels of Mexican local governments, and its stock price
followed. 30 Wal-Mart's stock price declined immediately after the
scandal broke, but it soon rebounded and has remained high since
then, despite considerable expense of internal and external
investigations.331
The FCPA and the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
give corporations credit for having a reasonable system of internal
controls in place to investigate internally reported wrongdoing, and
oversight by the independent board is a key element of the defense.332
From the investors' point of view, it is efficient for a corporation to
comply only cosmetically without stopping too many bribes.3 33 The
value of an independent board as a bribery-prevention mechanism
appears slight, but so is its cost to investors.
2. Accounting Scandals and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value
The decade-long bull period during the 1990s was followed by
jarring revelations of accounting scandals at dozens of large U.S.
corporations. 334 Executives aggressively managed their financial
statements to match investors' expectations of ever-rising stock

329. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, The Scam Wall Street Learned from the Mafia, ROLLING
STONE MAG. (June 21, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-scam-wallstreet-learned-from-the-mafia-20120620#ixzz2L4sJ6VsH ("[A] $10,000 bribe to a
politician-a couple of Super Bowl tickets and a limo-scored CDR [Financial Products,
Inc.] a total of $665,000 of the public's money.").
330. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After TopLevel Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at Al.
331. See Historical Price Lookup, WALMART.COM, http://stock.walmart.com/stockinformation/historical-price-lookup/. On April 20, 2012, the day before the New York
Times published the report on bribery, Wal-Mart's stock price closed at $62.45. Id. By
April 25, 2012, the price declined and closed at $57.36. Id. By May 18, 2012, the stock was
back up to pre-scandal level at $62.43, and it has since continued to increase. Id.; see also
Stephanie Clifford, The Annual Shareholders' Meeting for Wal-Mart, Like Its Stock, Is
Buoyant, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012, at B3.
332. See Langevoort, supranote 243, at 951-52.
333. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1341, 1407-10 (1999); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487,
513-14 (2003) (explaining that organizations can even use internal compliance structures
to hide management participation in illegal activity).
334. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 358 (2003) (noting that federal and state
regulators initiated fraud investigations at "dozens of corporations").
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prices.335 Ambiguous accounting obligations and captured auditors,
the widespread use of financial derivatives and special purpose
entities, and the inherently flawed self-regulatory system of corporate
governance made it relatively easy for executives to hide losses and
inflate earnings.336
Toward the end of the millennium, the number of material
accounting restatements increased from 49 per year to 156 in 2000.337
In the late 1990s, the SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt proposed
significant limits on consulting by audit firms to improve auditors'
ability to conduct independent audits and increase audit quality."
The Big Five accounting firms lobbied aggressively and prevented an
outright ban.33 9 In 2001, the SEC prohibited only the two most
obvious problematic subcategories of nonaudit services: information
system design and internal audit services.340
The push for reforms increased as the public learned in October
2001 that Enron issued false accounting statements and its auditor
shredded relevant documents. Congress considered a complete
restructuring of the audit industry, including a total ban on the
provision of nonaudit services by the audit firm, a. complete
separation between audit and consulting, and mandatory rotation of
the audit firm, but political gridlock stopped progress.34 1
While it was clear that the audit industry was facing
transformative regulation, investor and management groups
aggressively lobbied against additional reforms. The American Bar
Association recommended increasing director independence.34 2 The
Business Roundtable emphasized the importance of independent
directors and suggested that the board had an important role to play
by "[f]ocusing on the integrity and clarity of the corporation's

335. See Bratton, supra note 325, at 1359-60.
336. See id. at 1283; William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional
Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 783, 787 (2013).
337. Bratton, supra note 325, at 1284-85.
338. See Arthur Levitt, Editorial, Who Audits the Auditors?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002,
at A29.
339. See Bratton, supra note 325, at 1351.
340. See id. at 1351-52. It is an obvious conflict of interest for the auditor to prepare
financial statements and then opine on their consistency with the GAAP.
341. See id. at 1355-56; Labaton & Oppel, Jr., supra note 228, at Al.
342. See ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY
REPORT 13-23 (2002).

912

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

financial statements and financial reporting."34 3 In 2002, the NYSE set
up a corporate governance task force to restore public confidence by
showing that private regulation could address governance failures
without need for federal legislation." The new listing standards
mandated a majority independent board, independent oversight
committees, and tightened the definition of independence itself."
By June 2002, six months after Enron filed for bankruptcy, all
bills that were introduced in Congress to regulate the audit industry
and reduce conflicts of interest in financial intermediaries stalled."
On June 25, 2002, however, WorldCom announced a massive
accounting restatement and Congressional intervention became
certain.3 47 Congress considered far-reaching restrictions, and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that it ultimately passed "could have been much
worse [for investors] ....

[A]lmost anything would have passed on

the floor of the Senate." 348
The Act restructured the governance of the audit industry and
prohibited accounting firms from providing certain nonaudit services
to public corporations they audit." It required public firms to have
an independent audit committee and banned most loans by
corporations to their executives. 350 Notably, the Act did nothing to
limit the use of financial derivatives that helped conceal Enron's
fraud and led to its ultimate demise, and it did very little to limit the
widespread use of special purpose entities.35 1
Many commentators have pointed out that the Act's corporate
governance provision would not have prevented the accounting
343. BUS.

ROUNDTABLE,

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2002),

available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/governmentalprograms/pdflPrinciples of-Corp
_Gov.pdf.
344. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 1482. The NYSE spent two years revising the
proposed listing standards, and responding to suggestions from issuers, the SEC, and
institutional investors, who were very much involved during the process. See id.
345. For a contemporaneous discussion of the listing standards see generally
Bainbridge, supranote 10.
346. See Labaton & Oppel, supra note 228, at Al.
347. Ten days before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, Senator Jon Corzine, a
member of the Banking Committee, said the bill's momentum would have been weakened
if not for the scandals following Enron like WorldCom. See Spencer S. Hsu & Kathleen
Day, Senate Vote Spotlights Audit Reform and Sarbanes, WASH. POST, July 15, 2002, at
Al.
348. 148 CONG. REC. S7354 (daily ed. July 25,2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
349. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g) (2012)).
350. See id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-76; id. § 402, 116 Stat. at 787.
351. See id. § 401, 116 Stat. at 785-86 (requiring disclosure of off-balance-sheet
transactions).
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scandals that led to their adoption.352 Critics have argued that these
provisions in the Act are flawed.353 But the provisions make sense
when viewed as a substitute for laws avoided, including the regulation
of derivatives, which remained under-regulated until the financial
crisis exposed their risks.354
3. Financial Crisis and Executive Compensation
In 2008 and 2009, financial innovation, excessive leverage,
opaque risk-shifting, and outright fraud pushed major banks and
financial institutions into insolvency, producing the deepest recession
since the Great Depression. 35 5 Financial derivatives and lopsided
compensation in financial institutions-pay packages that reward
excessive risk-taking-were identified among the culprits for the
recession.
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 responded to this crisis by
bolstering the independence of compensation committees in all firms,
not just financial institutions, authorizing shareholder say-on-pay vote
and vote on payments to executives who are asked to leave (i.e.,
golden parachutes), and requiring exchanges to delist any firm that
does not provide for a clawback of excess compensation in the event
of an accounting restatement.357 Institutional investors strongly
supported these new corporate governance mandates.5
Several economic studies have shown that shareholders want
managers of federally insured financial institutions to take on more
risk than is socially optimal: shareholders and managers receive the
full upside benefit of risky activities, but bear little of the downside
cost because of deposit insurance. 359 Legal academics have argued
352. See Ahdieh, supra note 262, at 725-26.
353. See id. at 730.
354. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View ofEnron and the Sudden Death of "May,"
48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1249-50 (2003).
355. See CAROLYN B. MALONEY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, UNDERSTANDING
THE ECONOMY: STATE-BY STATE SNAPSHOTS 4 (2010), http://www.jec.senate.gov

/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File id=9af838f8-03b7-448f-9265-bd81cl4d2729.
356. See FIN. CRISIS INOUIRY COMM'N., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT

xix, xxiv (2011), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf;
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 313, at 247.
357. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 951, 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900, 1904 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n1, 78j-4 (2012)).
358. See Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 1815.
359. See George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of
Bankruptcy for Profit, 24 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 1993, at 2-3;
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 313, at 255-57; Timothy Swanson & Robin Mason, Long
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that it is absurd to further empower shareholders as the Dodd-Frank
Act did. Instead, critics believe it would be more efficient to force
managers of financial firms to be more risk averse, while investors
prefer them to be less so. 36 0 Yet the Dodd-Frank Act further
empowered investors.
Alternative proposals were considered, and in some cases
adopted, by legislators at the time: compensation caps, 61 expanded
compensation clawbacks,362 a ban on proprietary trading, 6
reinstituting the Glass-Steagall separation between investment
banking and federally insured retail banking,3" simplification and
standardization of derivatives,3 and corralling all derivatives in
clearinghouses and subjecting them to SEC regulation and
oversight.3 66 All of these alternatives were potentially more effective
Tail Risks and Endogenous Liabilities: Regulating Looting, 23 GENEVA PAPER ON RISK &
INS. 182, 187 (1998).
360. See Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 1818-19; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 313,
at 255.
361. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions
on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tgl5.aspx (capping compensation of senior executives of banks
needing exceptional assistance at $500,000, not including restricted stock).
362. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA"), Pub. L. No. 110343, § 111(b)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777 (2008), amended by American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, sec. 7001, § 111, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012)) (requiring sellers of troubled assets to have "[1]imits
on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of the TARP
recipient to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of such recipient
during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under
the TARP remains outstanding"); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
secs. 7000-02, §§ 111, 109(a), 123 Stat. at 516-21 (amending EESA and limiting incentive
payments to the CEO and the twenty next-highest-paid executives of large TARP
recipients to one-third of the executive's salary (other than payments required under
earlier contracts and restricted stock), prohibiting golden parachutes and defined "luxury"
expenditures, and mandating "say on pay" votes).
363. See Nick Paraskeva, U.S. Volcker Rule places major new demands on compliance,
REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2013), http:/Iblogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/12/17
/u-s-volcker-rule-places-major-new-demands-on-compliance/.
364. On December 16, 2009, Senators John McCain and Maria Cantwell proposed the
"Banking Integrity Act of 2009," a bill that never made it past the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. See S. 2886, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl11:SN02886:@@@D&summ2=m&/.
365. See Securitization of Assets: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 39 (2009) (prepared statement of Patricia A. McCoy, Professor and Director,
Insurance Law Center, University of Connecticut School of Law).
366. See Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase
Transparency and Reduce Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (testimony of Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
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at preventing the next financial crisis, but would have been
considerably more costly for investors than Dodd-Frank's corporate
governance solutions.
Unlike during the Sarbanes-Oxley debates, where institutional
investors played a minor supporting role,367 they aggressively
advocated corporate governance solutions during the Dodd-Frank
congressional debates.'68 Because the financial crisis was so profound
and economically destructive, it is not surprising that the Dodd-Frank
Act nonetheless included a plethora of substantive prohibitions, many
costly for investors. But the Act could and would have gone a lot
farther without institutional investors' lobbying for corporate
governance mandates.
C.

Summary

The board independence trend has continued unabated. This
Part has shown that the trend is at least in part a product of a
collective effort by institutional investors and management to deflect
federal regulation. Through clever use of political lobbying and
advocacy of corporate governance solutions, they have convinced
lawmakers and the public that board independence is superior to
command-and-control regulation despite the absence of evidence in
support.36 9
CONCLUSION

Institutional investors, exchanges, and government regulators
have pushed for increased board independence. The push has
continued despite inconclusive evidence that independent boards
improve corporate performance or reduce corporate malfeasance.
This Article suggests that institutional investors value director
independence because it displaces more meaningful reform.
Regulatory reform is inevitable after corporate scandals and
crises. But, the content of that regulation is not inevitable.
Institutional investors and managers have successfully convinced
lawmakers to rely on corporate governance reforms in lieu of more
367. See Romano, supra note 78, at 1569.
368. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 1801 (examining six corporate
governance reforms implemented by Dodd-Frank and explaining that their passage was
due, in large part, to institutional investor activism).
369. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law
Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 582, 591 (1984) (citation omitted) ("The real hidden
agenda of the independent director movement is to stave off more radical change by
convincing politicians and the public that independent directors are a reformer's
panacea.").
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stringent substantive regulation. Reforms involving independent
boards have been popular with Congress and regulators because
independence has connotations of objectivity, expertise, and fairness,
because independence is familiar, and because Congress wants to
minimize the cost of regulation and independence is inexpensive.
Independence may be inexpensive, but it is also ineffective.
Corporate profit and efficiency are not synonymous. Neither are
shareholder wealth and social welfare. Managerial disloyalty to
investors is only one type of welfare-reducing agency cost. Since
boards put the interests of investors first, the board may not stop
misconduct that siphons resources from other groups to investors,
from price fixing and bribes to excessive risk-taking and fraud. Future
corporate and financial reform should not aim to protect investors
from management. Rather, it needs to control externalities that
investors themselves impose on others. Board independence
mandates should be retired because they are inefficient at best and
damaging at worst.

